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ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY
Jason A. Cade*
Congressional amendments to the immigration code in the 1990s
significantly broadened grounds for removal while nearly eradicating
opportunities for discretionary relief. The result has been a radical
transformation of immigration law. In particular, the constriction of
equitable discretion as an adjudicative tool has vested a new and critical
responsibility in enforcement officials to implement rigid immigration rules
in a normatively defensible way, primarily through the use of prosecutorial
discretion. This Article contextualizes recent executive enforcement actions
within this scheme and argues that the Obama Administration’s targeted
use of limited enforcement resources and implementation of initiatives such
as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals reflect defensible efforts to
systematize equitable decision making principles within the new world of
American immigration law.
Having laid bare the practical realities of the modern immigration
system, this Article then argues that reliance on executive discretion alone
has thus far failed to ensure that individuals are deported only when
justified. Of particular importance, the Department of Homeland Security
under the current administration has all but abandoned any consideration
of the normative merits of removal when it comes to noncitizens with any
kind of criminal history. Indeed, the agency has used criminal history as an
indiscriminate marker of undesirability, regardless of the seriousness of the
underlying offense, the passage of time, the permanent resident status of the
noncitizen, the severity of hardship that deportation would cause for the
noncitizen’s family, and any other mitigating factors. A deportation system
that allocates all responsibility for fairness and proportionality to
enforcement actors raises other problems as well, including lack of finality
and heightened risk of conflict with other branches and levels of
government. These difficulties in turn can stymie the use of enforcement
discretion as an effective equitable tool.
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia Law School. For insightful comments at
various stages of this project, I am especially grateful to Jennifer Chacón, Dan Coenen,
Hiroshi Motomura, Usha Rodrigues, and Juliet Stumpf. I also thank Ben Barton, Nathan
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School of Law, and participants at American University Law Review’s Bordering on Legal
Limits? A Symposium Analyzing the President’s Executive Action on Immigration and at
the Emerging Immigration Scholars conference held at University of Miami. Laughlin
Kane, UGA Law ’15, provided excellent research assistance. Thanks to Dean Peter
Rutledge, Dean Rebecca White, and the University of Georgia for generous support.
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The situation cries out for legal redress. The reinvigoration of
adjudicative discretion and rollback of overly broad removal grounds
through statutory reform are goals well worth pursuing, and this Article
describes important measures that lawmakers might take toward those
ends. In the absence of congressional intervention, there remain important
steps the Executive could take to help ensure the proportionality and
fairness of the deportation system, despite the drawbacks of enforcementbased equity. This Article concludes by suggesting that if neither of the
political branches takes adequate steps to address this new set of problems,
it will be left to the federal judiciary to increase structural opportunities for
equitable consideration through closer regulation of the modern
deportation system.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2014, President Barack Obama announced an
executive program that would allow some undocumented noncitizen parents
of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to seek a temporary
reprieve from removal.1 The initiative, called Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), closely resembles
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a similar program
implemented in 2012 that gave some children and young adults the

1. See Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/DXN9SHLX].
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opportunity to apply for discretionary deferment of removal.2 These
unusual executive immigration actions have drawn fierce criticism from
some corners3 and praise from others.4 They have been targeted by
ongoing litigation5 and proposed reversionary legislation.6
This Article contextualizes DAPA and DACA as part of a significant and
ongoing transition in immigration law. These programs, though important
in themselves, are best seen as one component of the broad relocation of
equitable authority within the American deportation system from, back-end
adjudicators to frontline enforcement officials. This Article explains the
sources of this transformation, traces the primary ways in which the
executive branch has attempted to implement equitable enforcement, and
discusses the drawbacks of our new deportation system, which locates
discretionary authority almost exclusively in enforcement actors.
For much of immigration law’s history, immigration judges, as well as
state and federal sentencing judges in criminal cases concerning
noncitizens, were granted a large measure of equitable discretion. In
deciding individual cases, these adjudicators were empowered to take
account of the severity of deportation and circumstances that weighed for or
against the potential deportee.7 In the late twentieth century, however,
Congress discarded this approach. Instead, amendments to the immigration
code heralded the rise of criminal history, very broadly defined, as the
2. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodriguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border
Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States As Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of
U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WFE-WWLN].
3. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Opinion, Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was
Blocked, WALL STREET. J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15; Jeff Sessions, Sessions Comments on
President’s Impending Executive Amnesty Announcement, JEFF SESSIONS: U.S. SENATOR FOR
ALA. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?
ID=E06532D6-FAA1-4DC8-9A3A-F310B2CB72CE [http://perma.cc/4FWD-K9LN]; Jan
Ting, President Obama’s “Deferred Action” Program for Illegal Aliens Is Plainly
Unconstitutional, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDS. (Dec. 2014), http://cis.org/Obama-DeferredAction-Amnest-Executive-Action-Unconstitutional [http://perma.cc/Y9HU-U5RB].
4. See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Immigration and the DREAM Act, DICK DURBIN: U.S.
SENATOR ILL., http://www.durbin.senate.gov/issues/immigration-and-the-dream-act (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/AYN8-J84Z]; ROBERTO G. GONZALES & ANGIE M.
BAUTISTA-CHAVEZ, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, TWO YEARS AND COUNTING: ASSESSING
THE GROWING POWER OF DACA (2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/
two-years-and-counting-assessing-growing-power-daca
[http://perma.cc/9E3T-FVDU];
ZENEN JAIMES PÉREZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW DACA HAS IMPROVED THE LIVES OF
UNDOCUMENTED YOUNG PEOPLE (2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/report/2014/11/19/101868/how-daca-has-improved-the-lives-of-undocumentedyoung-people/ [http://perma.cc/5XRQ-WM8R].
5. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
16, 2015) (preliminarily enjoining expansion of the DACA program and the rollout of the
DAPA program).
6. See, e.g., Defund Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 155, 114th Cong. (as introduced by
House, Jan. 6, 2015).
7. See infra Part I.
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primary marker of undesirability, while squeezing consideration of
humanitarian or fairness concerns almost completely out of the adjudicative
stages of deportation or criminal proceedings. As a result of this statutory
shift, considerations of equity enter the deportation system (if at all)
primarily through the discretionary decisions of enforcement actors at both
federal and state levels.8
The size of the deportable population in the United States, and the
inability of most unauthorized persons to regularize their status, amplifies
the relative importance of enforcement discretion in immigration law.9
Over eleven million noncitizens living in the United States are potentially
removable on the basis of immigration violations.10 Many hundreds of
thousands more are lawfully present but now deportable because of criminal
convictions.11 These numbers far outrun the enforcement resources that
Congress has made available to the Executive. Indeed, current funding
levels—the highest ever—permit the removal of about 400,000 persons per
year, a number that must be apportioned between both interior and border
enforcement.12
Any normatively justifiable deportation system requires equity. By
“equity” or similar terms, this Article means “fair-mindedness” or
proportionality.13 Equity mitigates the effect of overly broad, punitive, and
inflexible statutes in ways that help ensure the law is fair and proportional

8. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 518–19 (2009) (“Prosecutorial discretion has thus overtaken the exercise
of discretion by immigration judges when it comes to questions of relief.”).
9. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 19–55 (2014) (explaining
the political and historical factors that contributed to the size of the current unauthorized
population and the connection with enforcement discretion); Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8,
at 510–14.
10. See Unauthorized Immigrant Population, by State, 2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov.
18,
2014),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants-2012/
(indicating that 11.2 million unauthorized persons resided in the United States in 2012)
[http://perma.cc/L6J3-QVFD].
11. DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA 12–13 (2012); Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 77 (2014); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of
the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1936 (2000).
12. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to
All ICE Emps., Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Priorities Memo],
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (stating that the
agency only has resources to remove a maximum of 400,000 persons per year)
[http://perma.cc/DE48-485T].
13. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658, 1662–88 (2010) (equating “equity” with
“fair-mindedness” and citing Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 205 (2003)). In this Article, I do not use the
term “equity” in the sense of the specific doctrines or remedies developed in the English
Court of Chancery, strains of which survive in modern jurisprudence. See generally Samuel
L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015).
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in its application to individual human beings.14 This principle is well
recognized in criminal law, where the extensive proliferation of penal laws
to regulate behavior that is not clearly blameworthy, the establishment of
mandatory minimum sentences, and the general inability of formal law to
predict and accommodate all possible mitigating circumstances create the
potential for injustice in many cases. These features of our criminal law
have given rise to a system of prosecutorial discretion, under which
enforcement officials wield wide-ranging authority to determine who
should be prosecuted and what alleged lawbreakers should be charged
While that degree of discretion creates the potential for
with.15
overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial abuse, it is recognized as
essential to temper and individuate the broad application of severe penalties
within the criminal law system.
The removal system similarly imposes dire penalties on the basis of a
broad range of civil infractions. These penalties consist primarily of
deportation followed by lengthy or permanent bars to lawful return, which
lead to collateral consequences, including the separation of caregivers from
U.S. citizen children and the loss of workforce.16 Detention during
deportation proceedings is also rampant.17 Sanctions as severe as these
should be scaled to the gravity of the underlying offense and balanced
against the noncitizen’s personal mitigating circumstances.18 Where
proportionality considerations are not part of back-end adjudicators’
discretion, they must be channeled to other parts of the process.
President Obama’s Administration clearly recognizes that the breadth
and severity of modern immigration rules, along with the scale of the
14. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARTISTOTLE
bk. V, ch. 10, 1795–96 (Barnes ed., 1984) (“[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is
not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct. . . . And this is the nature
of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.”);
Bowers, supra note 13, at 1685 (“Equitable discretion . . . tempers and thereby perfects
broad laws.”); see also infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part I.A; text accompanying notes 310–15.
17. See infra notes 276–79.
18. See Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the
People’s Sense of Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) (“[T]he severity of the
punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence in question; but it also
should be appropriate, having regard to the offender’s personal mitigation.”); Andrew von
Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 56 (1992)
(“People have a sense that punishments scaled to the gravity of offenses are fairer than
punishments that are not.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality
Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (“Proportionality is the notion that the
severity of a sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense.”).
Concerns based on equity, proportionality, or justice are generally thought to be distinct
from those based on mercy or forgiveness. See generally Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in
Immigration Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1563 (arguing that immigration reform should be
centered on the language of justice rather than the language of mercy). But cf. Bowers, supra
note 13, at 1681 (“A distinction can be drawn between the impulse to unjustly exercise
mercy to provide an exception from unquestionably deserved punishment and the impulse to
equitably exercise mercy to bridge the gap ‘between the inflexibility of the law and moral
justice.’” (quoting Alwynne Smart, Mercy, 43 PHILOSOPHY 345, 355 (1968))).
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removable noncitizen population, have created a system that consolidates
tremendous power over the equitable implementation of immigration law in
enforcement actors.19 It argued as much to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Arizona v. United States,20 when the administration challenged state
immigration laws that might interfere with its own enforcement priorities,
including decisions not to pursue some individuals for equitable reasons.21
Furthermore, in numerous public statements and internal agency policy
memoranda, the Obama Administration has signaled its intention to “do the
right thing” by ensuring that individual deportations are normatively
justified.22
Underlying the Executive’s approach to equitable immigration
enforcement is a system of tiered enforcement priorities, which have
structured the Administration’s choices about how to distribute limited
enforcement resources and guided its approach to the exercise of discretion
in individual cases.23 First, with respect to its distribution of enforcement
resources, the Obama Administration has shifted the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) focus toward border removals and programs
that target noncitizens with criminal histories. Thus, while the Obama
Administration has deported far more noncitizens than any previous
administration, a majority of those removals appear to be recent border
crossers or “criminal aliens.”24
Second, since 2011, policy heads in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), a subagency of DHS, have labored to train and
encourage agents and attorneys to exercise equitable discretion by deferring
or eschewing removal in appropriate cases.25 As I have shown elsewhere,
this administrative move to expand prosecutorial discretion has had mixed
results.26 Many ICE operatives have strenuously resisted the call for more
equitable enforcement.27 To be sure, the agency’s efforts in this regard
have increased consideration of mitigating factors in individual cases to
some degree. Even so, ground-level implementation of the prosecutorial
discretion guidelines remains highly inconsistent across the nation.28
Third, DACA and DAPA represent large and categorical discretionary
policy initiatives. These programs are designed to bring noncitizens who
meet certain equitable criteria out of the shadows to affirmatively present
themselves for discretionary consideration of temporary reprieves from

19. See infra Part I.
20. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2013).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security
with “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); Morton
Priorities Memo, supra note 12.
24. “Criminal aliens,” as defined by DHS, means noncitizens who have at least one prior
conviction. See generally infra Part II.B.1.
25. See infra Part II.B.2.
26. See generally Cade, supra note 11.
27. See infra Part II.B.2.
28. See infra Part II.B.2.
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deportation.29 Importantly, the use of the DACA and DAPA mechanisms
depart from the typical invocation of prosecutorial discretion in that they
assign equitable assessments to a special unit within a separate DHS
agency.30 This institutional design for discretionary consideration offers
the possibility of significant gains in transparency and consistency, not least
because of the crushing workloads currently facing ICE prosecutors in
deportation court.31 On the other hand, this division of agency functions
has led some observers to argue that these programs involve the affirmative
grant of benefits as opposed to discretionary forbearance with regard to
removal.32 Indeed, on February 16, 2015, a federal district court
preliminarily enjoined the rollout of DAPA along with the expanded
version of DACA announced by President Obama in late 2014.33
Although some critics of President Obama’s enforcement policies argue
he is “soft” on immigration,34 the on-the-ground reality is more complex.
The immigration enforcement agencies have taken an increasingly hard line
against all noncitizens defined as “criminal aliens.”35 This designation all
but guarantees removal, regardless of the seriousness of the underlying
offense, the passage of time, the permanent resident status of the noncitizen,
the degree of hardship that deportation would cause the noncitizen’s family,
or other mitigating factors.36 In addition, government attorneys have
pushed for expansive interpretations of the already broad criminal grounds
of deportation, and they continue to do so even in the face of multiple
reversals by the U.S. Supreme Court for ignoring “common sense.”37 The
most recent of these cases, Mellouli v. Lynch,38 concerned the government’s
deportation of a lawful permanent resident with significant equities who
had been convicted of possessing a sock as drug paraphernalia.39
The government’s stringent, indiscriminate approach with respect to
noncitizens who encounter the criminal justice system manifests in other
ways as well. ICE operatives teach sympathetic local district attorneys’
offices how to maximize the likelihood of removal following prosecution.40
29. See infra Part II.B.3.
30. See infra Part II.B.3.
31. See Cade, supra note 11, at 50–54; see also infra text accompanying notes 206–09,
222–36.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. Michael D. Shear & Julia Preston, Dealt Setback, Obama Puts Off Immigrant Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015, at A1. See generally infra Part III.B.
34. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickson, Is Obama Really the Deporter-in-Chief? Yes and No.,
DAILY BEAST (April 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/is-obamareally-the-deporter-in-chief-yes-and-no.html (“To immigration enforcement hawks,
[President Obama] is soft on illegal migrants, using his executive authority to make the
interior of the country a haven for certain classes of undocumented immigrants.”)
[http://perma.cc/P8LT-88F6].
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See Julia Preston, Report Finds Deportations Focus on Criminal Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2014, at A16.
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
39. Id. at 1985.
40. See infra Part III.A.
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Even arrests without conviction can trigger regulatory enforcement, as
cooperative and integrated data-sharing programs in the criminal justice
system have become ICE’s primary method of identifying deportable
noncitizens in the interior United States.41 Noncitizens with convictions are
frequently detained during the pendency of removal proceedings.42
Furthermore, federal authorities outside the DHS now actively participate in
the deportation (and criminalization) of noncitizens; indeed, crimes of
migration (i.e., illegal entry or illegal reentry) have become the most
prosecuted federal offenses by U.S. Attorneys.43
In short, while the rise in prosecutorial discretion initiatives and the
shifting of resources reflect an executive branch grappling with its
obligation to implement immigration enforcement in normatively justifiable
ways, the DHS under Obama has also embraced criminal history as a nearirrevocable proxy for noncitizen undesirability. Moreover, what qualifies
as criminal history for this purpose is extremely broad—most of the
criminal aliens removed in recent years have been convicted only of
migration crimes, traffic offenses, or other misdemeanors.44 Thus, equity
through enforcement discretion has fallen short when it comes to
noncitizens who encounter the criminal justice system.
There are other drawbacks to lodging deportation discretion exclusively
in the hands of criminal and immigration law enforcers. Intense workloads,
law enforcement biases, policy resistance, and other features of the removal
system increase the likelihood that the DHS’s ground-level operatives will
inconsistently consider equity in enforcement decisions.45 Enforcementbased equity also fails to provide the finality that has historically
accompanied adjudicative discretionary relief, because it does not actually
confer a change in immigration status, instead leaving the noncitizen in
perpetual limbo.46 Finally, attempts to systematize equitable consideration
through enforcement discretion are more likely to be met with skepticism
and controversy, as demonstrated by litigation and legislation embroiling
President Obama’s rollout of the DACA and DAPA initiatives.47
This situation cries out for redress. Instead of continuing to rely on
prosecutorial discretion to ensure fairness in the deportation system,
Congress should enact legislation that both scales back the breadth of
removal provisions and restores opportunities for adjudicators to balance
equities in a wider swath of individual cases. Likewise, Congress should
consider legalization programs that would allow undocumented persons
with significant equities to become lawfully present, thus easing the burden
on enforcement officials to sort out which of the eleven million removable
noncitizens would not justifiably be deported. These reforms are critical if
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See infra text accompanying notes 171–90, 282–84.
See infra text accompanying notes 276–79.
See infra text accompanying notes 280–81.
See infra text accompanying notes 191–92, 247–72.
See infra text accompanying notes 200–11, 238–45.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.B.
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we want a removal system that consistently avoids disproportionate
deportations.
It must be acknowledged, however, that comprehensive reform of
statutory immigration law is notoriously difficult to accomplish.48
Furthermore, even if Congress were to enact new laws in the near future,
lawmakers might not significantly retreat from the criminal history proxy or
establish wide scale legalization.49 In the absence of legislative reform, the
Executive must continue to strive to implement immigration laws in
normatively justifiable ways, including when it seeks to deport noncitizens
with criminal history. To be sure, this path to proportionality will continue
to present challenges, and the controversy and litigation that have stymied
programs like DACA may persuade executive branch officials that efforts
to make equitable enforcement more systematic and transparent carry
significant political risk. It would not be entirely surprising if, under future
administrations, DHS either throws enforcement discretion completely to
the wind or returns to the internal, secretive processes that were more
common in the 1970s.50 Those results would be unfortunate, but given
these realities, it ultimately may be left to courts to increase structural
opportunities for equitable consideration through closer scrutiny of the
removal system.51
In undertaking the above analysis, this Article connects and contributes
to several literatures. First, it continues recent work that a number of
scholars have published on the role (and efficacy) of prosecutorial
discretion in immigration law.52 This Article contextualizes wide scale
prosecutorial discretion as a necessary, if imperfect, component of a system
48. See Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Immigration Reform Looks Dead in This
Congress, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2015, 5:36 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/
immigration-reform-congress-115880.html [http://perma.cc/CT26-GHMC].
49. Much like criminal laws, political incentives tend toward the punitive when it comes
to regulating noncitizens with any criminal history. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523–64 (2001) (describing legislators’
political incentives in enacting punitive criminal codes).
50. See Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 42, 42–43 (1976).
51. See Jason Cade, Mellouli in the Context of the Modern Deportation System,
CRIMMIGRATION (June 5, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/2015/06/05/mellouli-in-thecontext-of-the-modern-deportation-system/ [http://perma.cc/XD8P-KKVL].
52. For a representative but incomplete sampling of this literature, see generally
MOTOMURA, supra note 9; SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE
OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Cade, supra note 11; Jason
A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth
Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013); Erin Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just
Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 119 (2014); Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8; Joseph Landau, DOMA and
Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619
(2012); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and
Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and
Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011); Nina Rabin,
Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S.
Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195 (2014).
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institutionally designed to locate primary responsibility for equitable
decision making in enforcement actors.53 More particularly, it parses and
explains distinctions between individual case-by-case discretion, categorical
initiatives like DACA and DAPA, and the use of targeted enforcement
resources within this institutional design. Second, this Article draws on a
substantial body of scholarly work on the integration of criminal law and
immigration enforcement,54 pointing out the particular implications of
“crimmigration law” for the administration of equity in the modern removal
system.
Third, this Article connects the role of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law with an emerging literature that argues for more
proportionality in the immigration system—work that thus far has focused
primarily on theoretical judicial challenges and legislative reforms.55 To be
sure, I concur with many commentators that Congress should amend the
immigration code to roll back overly broad removal provisions and restore
53. Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez thoughtfully described in 2009 how reforms to
the immigration code, as well as other historical and political developments in immigration
law, have shifted substantial screening power over the admission and removal of immigrants
to the executive branch and particularly to enforcement officials. See Cox & Rodríguez,
supra note 8. In this Article, I rely primarily on the lens of proportionality to elaborate on
that seminal work.
54. For a representative but incomplete sampling of this literature, see generally Jennifer
M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens:
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013); César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457; Daniel
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September
11th “Pale of Law”, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Allegra M. McLeod, The
U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
105 (2012); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); David Alan Sklansky,
Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367 (2006); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in
a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO STATE L.J. 599 (2015).
55. See KANSTROOM, supra note 11, at 216–24 (arguing that the United States should
look to international human rights law for models of proportionality in the administration of
immigration law); Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional
Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1303 (2013) (arguing for legislative reforms that would
“grant the right to remain to categories of noncitizens based on immigration status, length of
residence, family ties, military service, or other factors that accurately reflect connections”);
Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 560–68 (2015) (arguing primarily
for legislative solutions to reduce the possibility of deportation on the basis of minor
marijuana offenses); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 520, 524–27 (2007)
(arguing that courts could recognize and enforce greater procedural rights in immigration
court to prevent “crime-related deportations [that] are grossly out of proportion to the
underlying misconduct”); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683,
1728–40 (2009) (exploring possibilities for a legislative scheme that would calibrate
immigration sanctions based on the underlying goals of the immigration system and the
strength of the noncitizen’s family and community ties); Wishnie, supra note 18, at 416
(arguing that individual removal orders should be subject to constitutional challenges based
on disproportionality).
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adjudicative equity, and I offer guidelines toward those ends. But I also
confront the fact that prospects for legislative reform in this area remain
dim and accordingly suggest practical measures the Executive might
undertake to improve proportionality and fairness in the removal system.
Part I of this Article explains how the statutory amendments that
broadened the criminal removal grounds and narrowed adjudicative equity,
along with a substantial mismatch between funding and the size of the
deportable population, have delegated to enforcement officials the
responsibility to keep the system normatively just. Part II discusses the
Obama Administration’s efforts to systematize and implement equitable
enforcement discretion by focusing on resource distribution, prosecutorial
discretion, and the deferred action initiatives. Part III identifies the
drawbacks and limits of enforcement discretion, highlighting the
Administration’s failure to ensure that noncitizens—specifically those with
only minor criminal history—are not unjustifiably deported. Part IV
outlines a range of potential legislative and executive actions that would
improve the deportation system’s commitment to proportionality. Finally,
this Article concludes that in the absence of adequate legislative or
executive reform toward these ends, courts may end up playing a greater
role in regulating the deportation system.
I. THE DECLINE OF FORMAL EQUITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Broadly speaking, two groups of noncitizens are subject to deportation
under U.S. immigration law. One consists of undocumented persons, who
are deportable merely on the basis of being present in the United States
without authorization.56 The other group consists of lawfully present
noncitizens who become deportable after being convicted of certain
offenses or who engage in other prohibited behavior, such as unlawful
voting. As the following sections explain, over time Congress has reduced
the opportunities for noncitizens in either group to avoid deportation
through adjudicative equitable discretion, instead shifting to a system that
depends heavily on enforcement discretion to ensure proportionality.
A. A Categorically Unforgiving Code
Immigration law today extensively relies on criminal history, both before
and after entry to the United States, to screen out undesirable noncitizens.
Beginning in 1917, Congress periodically enacted laws providing for the
deportation of noncitizens convicted of certain crimes, subject to

56. The applicable statutory provision depends on whether the noncitizen entered
without inspection, overstayed an authorized period of admission, or failed to comply with
specific visa requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 2002
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (providing that persons present in the
United States without having been admitted are inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)
(providing that persons who overstay authorized periods of admission are deportable); id.
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (providing that persons who violate the terms of their admission are
deportable).
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limitations, with various possibilities for relief.57 Until the late twentieth
century, however, criminal history did not play a significant role in
determining the desirability of noncitizens, whether already inside U.S.
borders or seeking entry for the first time.58 The criminal grounds for
removal that did exist were generally subject to limitations that prevented
lawfully resident noncitizens from being deported on the basis of conduct
that occurred long ago, or after they had been in lawful permanent status for
a significant period of time.59 Additionally, those who were subject to
deportation, whether lawfully present or not, were usually afforded the
opportunity to argue that their positive equities and connections in the
United States outweighed the gravity of their infractions, even when
convicted of serious criminal activity.60
Today, immigration penalties are deeply enmeshed with (and often
unavoidable consequences of) criminal convictions.61 As the Supreme
Court observed in Padilla v. Kentucky,62 even minor convictions trigger
detention, establish grounds for the removal of LPRs and other noncitizens,
restrict most discretionary relief, and generally preclude the possibility of
lawful return to the United States.63 In the modern immigration code,
criminal history has become a nearly irrevocable proxy for undesirability.
The hardwiring of the criminal history proxy consists of statutory
provisions that impose immigration consequences on the basis of
convictions. In the late twentieth century, Congress significantly expanded
the kinds of criminal conduct triggering immigration consequences.64 The
precise consequences vary depending on the nature of the conviction and
(sometimes) sentence, but they include deportation, detention, and
57. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874 (providing for the
deportation of noncitizens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years
of entry, or two crimes involving moral turpitude at any time, if a sentence of one year or
more was imposed). See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 133–36 (2007); Hernández, supra note 54, at 1464–66.
58. According to the federal government’s statistics, between 1892 and 1984, 14,287
persons were excluded on the basis of a criminal or narcotics violation, out of a total of
633,918 exclusions during that period. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 175 tbl.60.
During the period between 1908 and 1980, 56,669 persons were deported on the basis of a
criminal or narcotics violation, out of a total of 812,915 persons deported during that period.
Id. at 183 tbl.65. See generally Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2013).
59. See generally THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 664–74 (7th ed. 2012); Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621–24 (2006).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 96–102.
61. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010); see also id. at 369 (noting that
removal is a “presumptively mandatory” consequence of a wide range of convictions).
Indeed, the breadth of the criminal history proxy in modern immigration law led the Padilla
Court to expand noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment right to effective criminal counsel to include
accurate information about the immigration consequences of convictions. Id.; see also Cade,
supra note 51.
62. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 70–85, 100–15.
64. See generally Morawetz, supra note 11.
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prohibition on lawful return, either for a lengthy period or permanently. At
the same time, Congress tightly constricted opportunities for discretionary
relief from removal at both the federal and state levels.
The most significant new criminal deportation ground enacted in this
period was the “aggravated felony.”65 Crimes that fall within the
aggravated felony category trigger mandatory detention, deportation, and a
permanent bar on lawful return to the United States.66 Aggravated felons
are statutorily disqualified from eligibility for asylum or other discretionary
relief from removal.67 Additionally, any noncitizen who is not an LPR and
who has a conviction that DHS deems an aggravated felony can be placed
in the “administrative removal” process—an expedited forum that offers
even fewer protections or opportunities for remedial leniency than are
available in regular immigration court.68
Aggravated felonies initially consisted of only three serious offenses:
murder, firearms trafficking, and drug trafficking.69 Now the list includes
twenty-eight offenses.70 The aggravated felony categories encompass many
minor offenses, including crimes defined as misdemeanors and barely
punished under state penal law.71 Case law is replete with examples of how
broadly and indiscriminately the aggravated felony category can reach,
encompassing misdemeanor battery where no jail time is served, the sale of

65. INA § 101(a)(43)(A)–(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012).
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien . . . who seeks admission . . . at any
time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”).
67. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (aggravated felony considered to be a “particularly serious
crime” barring asylum and withholding of removal); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (cancellation of
removal unavailable to LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)
(cancellation of removal unavailable to non-LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony or other
criminal offenses specified in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)).
68. See id. § 1228(b)(1)–(2). See generally JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND
SEC.: OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 2,
Box 1 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_
2013.pdf (“Administrative Removal: The removal of an alien not admitted for permanent
residence, or of an alien admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis pursuant to
section 216 of the INA, under a DHS order based on the determination that the individual
has been convicted of an aggravated felony (INA § 238(b)(1)). The alien may be removed
without a hearing before an immigration judge.”) [http://perma.cc/VF52-KR5Z]; ALISON
SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43892, ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS: OVERVIEW AND
TRENDS 9–10 (2015) (describing expedited removal of non-LPRs deemed to have been
convicted of aggravated felonies pursuant to INA section 238(b)).
69. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344(a), 102 Stat.
4181, 4469–71 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012)).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U). Although there are only twenty-one subsections,
several of the sections describe multiple offenses. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (defining
aggravated felony to include murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor). Some of the
aggravated felony grounds create further subcategories. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 “for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year”); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offenses “for which the term of imprisonment
[is] at least one year”).
71. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offenses “for which the term of imprisonment
[is] at least one year”).
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a single marijuana cigarette, simple marijuana possession (in some
circumstances), petty shoplifting offenses, and other minor crimes.72
Congress has also expanded the narcotics ground of removal to include
any controlled substance offense. Lawfully present noncitizens with a
controlled substance conviction, with the tiny exception of a single
conviction for simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, find
themselves deportable and subject to mandatory detention during the
pendency of their proceedings.73
Although many states punish
misdemeanor drug offenses only with small fines,74 the level of punishment
does not matter in triggering the controlled substance ground of removal.75
Convictions for “domestic violence” crimes also trigger deportation, and, as
with the controlled substance ground, the immigration code is indifferent as
to whether the state provides for lenient sentences, diversion, or alternatives
to incarceration.76
Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) are another expansive
deportation category that includes both serious and minor offenses. For
example, the CIMT category includes petty shoplifting,77 theft of service
offenses like turnstile jumping,78 misdemeanor indecent exposure,79 and
passing bad checks.80 Lawfully present noncitizens are deportable for one
CIMT committed within five years of admission, or two CIMTs at any
time, even if the criminal punishment amounts only to a fine or community
service.81 While this category has been a ground of removal for nearly a
century, until the 1990s multiple levels of equitable consideration were
baked into the immigration code, giving both criminal and immigration
judges authority to consider whether removal was appropriate in individual
Today, the commission of two CIMTs all but compels
cases.82

72. See Cade, supra note 58.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
74. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-18-406(1) (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.027(4) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 453.336(4)(a) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-10(a)(4) (West 2013); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, .10 (McKinney 2013).
75. Cade, supra note 58, at 1760; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
77. Da Rosa Silva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that shoplifting is a crime constituting moral turpitude).
78. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
79. See Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79, 80 (B.I.A. 2013) (holding that
CAL. PENAL CODE § 314(1) (2012), which includes misdemeanor-level indecent exposure
violations, is a CIMT).
80. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-2.4 (West 2013) (classifying the offense of
passing bad checks as a “disorderly persons offense”); Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th
Cir. 1935) (describing check forgery as an offense that involves moral turpitude); Susan L.
Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50
ARK. L. REV. 269, 312–13 (1997) (explaining that passing bad checks is a crime that may
involve moral turpitude under deportation law).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (CIMT within five years of admission). Two CIMTs
make noncitizens deportable regardless of whether either was committed within five years of
admission. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
82. See infra notes 95–101 and accompanying text.
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deportation.83 Finally, although a single CIMT conviction does not
categorically bar discretionary relief, in most cases no such relief will be
available as a practical matter, as explained more thoroughly below.84
A host of other criminal offenses inevitably lead to deportation.85 In
addition, although not all grounds of deportation mandate detention,
noncitizens facing any criminal ground of removal are often detained on a
discretionary basis.86 Indeed, it appears that Congress has required that at
least 34,000 persons be kept in immigration detention every single day.87
Members of Congress also were concerned about noncitizens who
managed to avoid conviction-based removals, despite their admission of
guilt, through deferred adjudication or similar criminal court processes.88
The legislative solution was to enact, as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a special, broader
definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes.89 Thus, under the
current immigration code, a noncitizen qualifies as “convicted” so long as
there was an adjudication or admission of guilt plus the imposition of any
kind of penalty.90 This expansive definition is of rising importance because
state legislatures, prosecutors, and criminal court judges increasingly rely
on diversion programs as opposed to incarceration for a wide range of
offenses, including low-level drug, domestic violence, and traffic crimes.91
The key point is that even lawfully present persons who are tracked into
diversion programs—and thus have the chance to clear their records for
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (convictions of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude make any noncitizen deportable regardless of the length of sentence or date of
commission); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (nonpermanent residents ineligible for cancellation
of removal if they lack good moral character or if convicted under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)).
84. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
85. See generally MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS (5th ed. 2012).
86. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention As Punishment,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1348–50, 1379–88 (2014).
87. Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR
(Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-knownimmigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full [http://perma.cc/VJ5L-JR9R].
Some
scholars have argued that Congress has required only that 34,000 detention beds be
available, not necessarily that they be filled. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
More Humane Immigration Law, CRIMMIGRATION (March 17, 2014), http://crimmigration.
com/2014/03/17/more-humane-immigration-law/ [http://perma.cc/LKU9-6LK9].
88. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating that
members of Congress intended that a confession of guilt would be sufficient to establish a
conviction for immigration purposes, even in cases where adjudication is deferred). See
generally Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 380–81,
418–19 (2012).
89. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (defining “conviction” as “a
formal judgment of guilt . . . entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld,
where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the
judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be
imposed”).
90. Id.
91. Cade, supra note 88, at 394–401.
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state law purposes—remain “convicted” for federal immigration law
purposes and are subject to deportation and other immigration
consequences.
The Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) broad definition of
conviction has facilitated other harsh results that many in Congress likely
never foresaw but that are now commonplace.92 For example, the agency
has applied this provision to justify removing noncitizens while their
appeals were still pending on direct appeal,93 as well as persons whose
convictions were judicially expunged or vacated on rehabilitative rather
than procedural grounds.94
Even as Congress dramatically expanded criminal-based deportation, it
simultaneously took a scalpel to the statutory opportunities for equitable
adjudicatory assessment that had been a part of immigration law since the
enactment of the first criminal deportation provisions. To begin with,
Congress removed the ability of state law enforcement actors to avert the
immigration consequences of convictions. From 1917 to 1990, the INA had
explicitly delegated to state or federal judges presiding over noncitizen
criminal cases the “authority to decide whether a particular conviction
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.”95 This mechanism, which
authorized issuance of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
(JRAD), was grounded in the understanding that the criminal court judge
had access to valuable information about the facts of the crime and the

92. See, e.g., Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I.& N. Dec. 512, 529–46 (B.I.A. 1999)
(Villageliu, Board Member, dissenting) (noting that the legislative record for IIRIRA only
evinced intent to eliminate deferred adjudications and said nothing of vacaturs and
expungements).
93. See, e.g., Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the
Government’s argument that under the INA’s definition of conviction, noncitizens may be
deported while their convictions are still pending on direct appeal); Planes v. Holder, 652
F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th
Cir. 2004) (same); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing in dicta that
IIRIRA abrogated the finality rule); Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Rehearing En Banc
at 6–7, Planes, 652 F.3d 991 (No. 07-70730) (presenting the government’s argument that
under the INA’s definition of conviction, noncitizens may be deported while their
convictions are still pending on direct appeal).
94. Convictions that have been vacated for procedural or substantive defects generally
will not trigger immigration consequences. The complex and inconsistent body of law in
this area follows a tortuous legislative and judicial history. See generally Matter of
Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v.
Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006); Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378,
1379–80 (B.I.A. 2000); Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (B.I.A. 1999), rev’d
on other grounds, Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding on
equal protection grounds that expungement of first time drug offenses under state law should
be given preclusive effect where the offender would meet the requirements of the Federal
First Offender Act (FFOA)), overruled by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that equal protection does not require expunged state convictions to be
treated the same as federal drug convictions expunged under FFOA); Cade, supra note 88.
95. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362 (2010) (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793
F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The
Sentencing Judge As Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1145–51 (2002) (discussing
Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation).
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defendant’s circumstances.96 JRADs offered sentencing judges a powerful
tool to avert unjust removals.97 In 1990, however, Congress stripped state
and federal courts of the ability to issue this equitable relief.98 Another
equity-squelching legislative reform from the 1990s affected state authority
to limit the impact of convictions in the interest of justice, allowing
immigration authorities to treat many (though not all) convictions as
deportable offenses even when the noncitizen has been fully and
unconditionally pardoned.99
Congress also slashed adjudicative equitable relief at the federal level in
this era. Before 1996, immigration judges were authorized by the INA to
determine whether deportation was warranted in individual cases based on
factors such as the nature of the offense, the length of the noncitizen’s
residence, the hardship that deportation would visit on the noncitizen’s
family members, and evidence of rehabilitation.100 Immigration judges
were empowered to make this determination for both lawfully present and
undocumented noncitizens.101
The modern discretionary analogue, called “cancellation of removal,” is
less generous. To determine whether to grant this relief, immigration
judges “must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane
considerations presented in his (or her) behalf . . . .”102 For LPRs,
cancellation is available only to those noncitizens who have resided
continuously in the United States for seven years after lawful admission and
who have been in LPR status for at least five years.103 Furthermore, to
qualify, noncitizens must have “good moral character” within the preceding
96. See, e.g., Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense
Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 39–40 (2010).
Stephen Lee has suggested that another policy goal promoted by JRADs is increased
transparency and supervision over the ways that criminal justice actors influence
downstream immigration consequences. Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 553, 598–99 (2013).
97. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361–62.
98. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
99. See generally Cade, supra note 88, at 373–80; Stacy Caplow, Governors! Seize the
Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief from Deportation, 22 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (2013); Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law,
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253 (2010).
100. See Lory D. Rosenberg & Denyse Sabagh, A Practitioner’s Guide to INA § 212(c),
93-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (1993).
101. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 212(c), 66 Stat.
163, 187, repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-597 (1996); former INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (repealed Sept. 30, 1996) (providing
for suspension of deportation for non-LPRs); see also IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 1353 (14th ed. 2014) (citing cases holding that lawful domicile was sufficient
for 212(c) relief, but noting some cases held to the contrary).
102. Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998). The discretionary positive
and negative criteria for those eligible to seek LPR cancellation remain roughly the same as
they were for 212(c) relief. See id.; Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 186 (B.I.A.
1984); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978).
103. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012).
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seven years, defined to exclude persons who have been incarcerated for an
aggregate of 180 days or more.104 Even for this small group of noncitizens,
commission of any removable offense or service of an immigration court
charging document stops the accrual of time for purposes of establishing
continuous residence.105 Although not explicitly prohibited from seeking
cancellation of removal, permanent residents deportable under the CIMT
provision are by definition foreclosed from establishing the seven year
residency requirement to qualify for this relief due to the time-stopping
provision.106 And, as already mentioned, noncitizens deportable on the
aggravated felony ground are statutorily ineligible for this or other
discretionary relief from removal proceedings, regardless of hardship, the
strength of their ties in the United States, the passage of time since their
offense, or whether their offense would have been classified as an
aggravated felony at the time of conviction.107
Noncitizens who are not LPRs are even less likely to secure discretionary
relief from removal under this provision.108 Such persons must show ten
years of continuous physical presence in the United States immediately
preceding the application and ten years of “good moral character” at the
time of adjudication.109 They must also demonstrate that removal would
result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a spouse, parent,
or child. Notably, this family member must be a citizen or LPR for this
hardship to qualify.110 As with LPR cancellation, continuous physical
presence is deemed to end upon commission of certain criminal acts or
service of the charging document.111 Moreover, Congress capped the
number of non-LPRs who could receive cancellation at 4000 annually.112
This statutory limit is significant; over the last half-decade, the cap on
available cancellation grants for non-LPRs has been reached early each
fiscal year.113 Finally, Congress also has significantly limited judicial
review of what little adjudicatory discretion remains.114
104. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1229b(a).
105. See id. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)–(B).
106. See Morawetz, supra note 11, at 1941 (observing that commission of a crime stops
accumulation of seven years residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation of
removal, functionally preventing a noncitizen deportable on the basis of having committed a
CIMT within five years of entry from accessing this relief).
107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Various other factors or inadmissibility grounds also bar
certain noncitizens from seeking LPR cancellation. See id. § 1229b(c).
108. See id. § 1229b(b).
109. Id.
110. See id. Even vacated convictions may be used to foreclose noncitizens from
establishing good moral character for purposes of non-LPR cancellation. See, e.g., NunezReyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
111. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d).
112. Id. § 1229b(e)(1).
113. See Margaret Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation? Rationalizing
Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L. & POL. 527,
540–42 (2015) (explaining that when the statutory gap is reached each fiscal year, the
government’s policy and practice is to hold decisions in abeyance until following years).
114. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245, or . . . any other decision or action of the
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The upshot is that under current law, most convictions trigger some
ground for deportation or other significant immigration consequences, even
for long-term lawfully present noncitizens.115 Distinctions between types
of convictions still matter, to be sure, because some removal grounds
preclude any opportunity to have individual equities or considerations of
justice balanced by an adjudicator and may trigger mandatory detention or
permanent banishment. Outside of the strict criteria described above,
however, the INA no longer provides formal limitations on removal based
on consideration of length of residence, contributions to society, the number
and strength of relationships with U.S. citizen family members, health, or
other equitable factors.116
B. Equitable Delegation
Removing equitable discretion from the purview of judges does not
necessarily excise it from the system. As has long been recognized in the
criminal law field, efforts to curtail adjudicative equitable consideration
simply shift the locus of discretionary power to prosecutors and police.117
Likewise, when Congress broadened grounds for removal and reduced the
authority of immigration judges to set aside morally questionable
deportations by narrowing the possibilities for the statutory exercise of
discretion, it transferred authority over equitable discretion to the system’s
other players.118 The effect was to directly increase the power of executive
enforcement officials, who must determine how to prioritize the agency’s
scarce resources through enforcement decisions.
There are good reasons to think Congress favors, or at least has
acquiesced in, a system in which the Executive is responsible for wielding
equitable discretion through enforcement decisions. First, Congress is well
aware of the relationship between the breadth or severity of penal laws, the
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of
the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief under section 208(a) [asylum].”).
115. Minor convictions also affect eligibility for Temporary Protected Status,
discretionary enforcement initiatives like DACA, and visa eligibility. See Cade, supra note
58, at 1761–62.
116. “Registry,” a form relief from removal based on long and continuous presence in the
United States, still exists on the books but is now practically available to very few persons.
See INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012) (giving the Attorney General discretion to allow
noncitizens who entered the United States. before January 1, 1972, have resided
continuously since that time, have good moral character, and are not subject to various
criminal bars, to adjust status to lawful permanent residence).
117. See Bowers, supra note 13, at 1687 (noting that “efforts to pretend away equitable
discretion serve merely to channel it to the justice system’s least transparent actors
(prosecutors)”); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (discussing how mandatory sentencing guidelines
transfer equitable power to prosecutors); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981).
118. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 510–14 (observing that the size of the
deportable population functionally gives the Executive much screening power to determine
immigration priorities); Lee, supra note 96, at 572–77 (arguing that the immigration
system’s reliance on criminal convictions transfers immigration screening power to criminal
prosecutors).
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restriction of judicial discretion, and the role of enforcement discretion.
Congress “has created a system of criminal laws that requires—and has
always required—the exercise of discretion.”119 Indeed, as Zachary Price’s
recent research indicates, the acceptability of executive authority not to
enforce fully Congress’s penal laws for reasons of justice or equity has
roots reaching back to the early Republic.120 The proliferation and breadth
of penal laws—the core of the modern “overcriminalization”
phenomenon—suggests that legislatures regularly pass punitive codes they
do not actually wish prosecutors or police to enforce fully.121 Moreover,
federal legislators have explicitly acknowledged, in the context of enacting
sentencing guidelines, that curbing judicial discretion “will not eliminate
discretion, but merely shift the discretion to an earlier stage.”122
In short, the widely recognized consequence of broadening grounds for
penalties and narrowing adjudicative discretion is that law enforcement
actors functionally are delegated tremendous power to determine the penal
code’s actual priorities.123 Scholars have made similar insights about the
Professors Adam Cox and Cristina
administrative law system.124
Rodríguez, in particular, have thoughtfully examined the connection
between the stringency of the modern immigration code and the rise of the
President’s screening power through agency enforcement decisions.125
Notably, when media accounts and other reports suggested that the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began
indiscriminately enforcing the harsher statutory deportation provisions
Congress enacted in 1996, many of the same legislators who had voted for
119. Stith, supra note 117, at 1422.
120. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.
671, 716–48 (2014); see also Stith, supra note 117, at 1422.
121. ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 13 (2007) (“Legislatures pass laws
criminalizing a vast array of behaviors, and some of these laws, such as fornication and
adultery, for example, stay on the books long after social mores about these behaviors have
changed. In addition, some offenses warrant prosecution in some instances but not others.”);
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532,
533 (1970); Stuntz, supra note 49, at 570–71 (“Legislators have good reason to criminalize
more than they (or the public) would want punished . . . .”).
122. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 263 (1993)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 35–36 (1984)).
123. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1354 (2008); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (1996) (“[B]y creating too many policy
choices, [legislatures] have effectively abdicated public policy-making to the prosecutor
since it is the prosecutor, and not the legislature, that has the final decision in determining
which public policy, if any, is breached by an individual’s conduct.”); Stuntz, supra note 49,
at 519.
124. See, e.g., KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES 8–10 (2013)
(explaining that “both federal and state courts have ruled that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is an executive function necessary to the proper administration of justice”);
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC
SERVICES 29–39 (2010) (discussing the relationship between administrative discretion and
the allocation of enforcement resources).
125. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 518–19.
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the amendments wrote to the Attorney General expressing surprise and
urging the agency to employ prosecutorial discretion more systematically in
order to avoid “unjustifiable hardship.”126 The legislators’ letter cited
examples of “unfair” deportations, including LPRs “who came to the
United States when they were very young, and many years ago committed a
single crime at the lower end of the ‘aggravated felony’ spectrum, but have
been law-abiding ever since, obtained and held jobs and remained selfsufficient, and started families in the United States.”127 The letter prompted
the INS to issue its first comprehensive directive on the implementation of
prosecutorial discretion.128
Congress’s consent to the current system of prosecutorial-based equity
may also be inferred for other reasons. As previously noted, at present an
estimated eleven million persons live in the United States without lawful
immigration status.129 Additionally, the rise of the criminal history proxy
made millions of lawfully present residents deportable on the basis of
criminal convictions. Immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura has traced
the political and historical factors that suggest longstanding congressional
acquiescence in the large undocumented population, including nearly a
century of economic reliance on Mexican migrants for cheap labor,
facilitated in large part by failure to meaningfully enforce restrictions on
both unlawful entry across the border or the employment of undocumented
workers.130 Even as attitudes about undocumented workers specifically and
immigration enforcement generally have become more stringent,
Congress’s funding allocations to the Executive’s immigration agencies
permit enforcement against only a very small fraction of both groups of
deportable persons. Indeed, the government frequently notes it has the
resources only to remove a maximum of about 400,000 persons each
year.131 Furthermore, these appropriations must be divided between
interior and border removals.132 This underfunding strongly suggests that
Congress depends on the Executive to set priorities in choosing which tiny
fraction of the removable population to target.133 Indeed, statutory

126. Letter from Henry J. Hyde et al., Representatives, U.S. Cong., to Janet Reno,
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice & Doris M. Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999), www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/
991104congress-letter.pdf. (signed by twenty-eight members of the House of
Representatives) [http://perma.cc/B85V-GT6F].
127. Id.
128. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents & Reg’l & Dist. Counsel (Nov. 17,
2000),
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000-memo.
pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6H5-DPLR].
129. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
130. MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 19–55; see also MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 93–95, 265–66 (2004).
131. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5 tbl.6 (showing breakdowns between interior
and border enforcement for 2011 through 2013).
133. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 464 (“The President’s power to decide which
and how many noncitizens should live in the United States operates principally at the back
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provisions specifically delegate broad authority to the Secretary of
Homeland Security to set “enforcement policies and priorities.”134
It is also important to recognize that the statutory amendments elevating
the role of criminal history in deportation law transferred immigration
screening power to a different set of law enforcement actors. Because the
immigration code attaches immigration consequences to a large number of
criminal offenses, local police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
sentencing judges wield wide-ranging influence over the pool of
noncitizens deemed undesirable on the basis of criminal history.135 Arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing often become definitive markers for
purposes of deportation under current law.136 As Stephen Lee observes,
“[B]y the time [noncitizens] reach removal proceedings, their best chance to
avoid removal has already passed.”137
State and federal prosecutors exert particular influence on downstream
immigration consequences.138 They select the criminal charges to be filed,
the plea deal to be offered, and the sentence to be recommended in the
event of a plea agreement. As is well known, nearly all prosecutions are
resolved through plea agreements.139 Heidi Altman and others have argued
that prosecutors’ ethical duty to see justice done encompasses making an
effort to reach a plea deal that takes the proportionality of deportation into
account.140 But criminal prosecutors can and do take very different
end of the system, through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to whom to
deport . . . .”).
134. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad
power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the administration and enforcement of
this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens”).
135. See generally Motomura, supra note 52 (explaining that local police can largely
determine the pool of potential undesirable noncitizens through investigation and arrest
practices).
136. The nature of the criminal conviction may also impact the likelihood of detention,
the process afforded the noncitizen, the noncitizen’s ability to lawfully return to the United
States in the future, and the severity of criminal sanctions in the event of an unlawful return.
137. Lee, supra note 96, at 556.
138. Further, the amplified possibility that immigration consequences will flow from a
conviction may even increase a prosecutor’s power in criminal proceedings. See id. at 577.
But see Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1411, 1422–33 (2005) (predicting the growing shadow of immigration consequences will
lead to more criminal trials).
139. See STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, tbl.5.46.2004, www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) (reporting that about ninety-five percent of criminal convictions result from pleas)
[http://perma.cc/KJG4-RB8Z]; id. tbl.5.24.2009, www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009
.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (reporting that ninety-six percent of non-dismissed federal
criminal cases during fiscal year 2009 ended with a guilty plea) [http://perma.cc/Z378-6938].
140. See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of
Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2012) (arguing that professional
responsibility standards and proportionality concerns do or will lead many prosecutors to
individually evaluate the justifiability of deportation); Robert M.A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011)
(arguing that Padilla will directly and indirectly influence prosecutors’ consideration of
collateral consequences, presenting an opportunity to both do “justice and improve public
safety”).
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approaches to this matter due to variations in office policies, local
workloads, and beliefs about appropriate types of immigrants and levels of
immigration.141
In short, Congress has delegated primary power over implementation of
immigration priorities to enforcement actors at the federal and local levels.
Back-end adjudicators are reduced to a much-diminished role in
immigration courts. Thus, equity enters the deportation system, if at all,
primarily through enforcement discretion. These front-end actors have the
power to consider whether deportation would be equitable in individual
cases and to influence the downstream result through discretionary choices
to forego prosecution or, if criminal proceedings are brought, through the
negotiation over plea deals.
II. EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Thus far, this Article has explained that statutory amendments to the INA
in the late twentieth century, along with underfunding of enforcement
resources, functionally shifted equitable balancing in deportation cases to
prosecutorial officials. This part will show that the executive branch clearly
recognizes—and seeks to protect—its role in keeping the deportation
system normatively justifiable. It also outlines the primary ways in which
the current Administration has endeavored to implement equitable
enforcement.
A. Acknowledgement of the Equitable Role
The Obama Administration appears to understand, and to take seriously,
its responsibility to ensure the deportation system operates equitably. The
Executive’s clearest acknowledgement—and most forceful defense—of this
new institutional role came in the context of its preemption lawsuit against
the state of Arizona. In 2010, Arizona enacted the “Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” better known as SB 1070.142
Before the law became effective, the federal government sued to enjoin four
of its core provisions.143
The first and most prominent of a number of similar state laws, SB 1070
gave local law officers a significant role in federal immigration

141. See Altman, supra note 140, at 28–32 (presenting data on the range of attitudes in
the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office regarding appropriateness of taking immigration
consequences into account during plea bargaining); Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t
Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1400–02 (2011) (arguing that, at least with respect
to high-volume drug trafficking cases, “no amount of creative negotiation between wellinformed attorneys is likely to yield a disposition that avoids triggering automatic
deportation”); Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry As Crime, Deportation As Punishment:
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011) (analyzing
state criminal process laws that take immigration status into account in ways that sometimes
disadvantage noncitizens); Eagly, supra note 54, at 1156–96 (discussing three prosecutors’
offices where alienage is variously treated as a neutral or negative factor).
142. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
143. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
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enforcement.144 By requiring only that local authorities act to enforce
already existing federal immigration laws, the architects of these bills had
hoped to withstand a preemption challenge.145 Their theory was premised
on the fact that states commonly help enforce federal law. Accordingly,
proponents of such bills argued that state laws that “mirror” federal
prohibitions should not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.146 In Arizona v.
United States,147 however, the Court upheld a preliminary injunction
against three of the four challenged statutory provisions.148
For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of this litigation is the
extent to which the federal government grounded its preemption arguments
in the need to preserve its ability to exercise equitable discretion without
interference from states. The Government argued that it must be able to
make discretionary nonenforcement choices, free from interference by state
law enforcement officers, whose actions pursuant to SB 1070 might unduly
burden noncitizens or exert exogenous influence on federal deportation
priorities.
Describing the institutional scheme in general, the government’s main
brief to the Supreme Court observed that “Congress vested the Executive
Branch with the authority and the discretion to make sensitive judgments
with respect to aliens, balancing the numerous considerations involved,”
which include “national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, [and]
humanitarian considerations . . . .”149 The Administration pressed the point
that an uninvited state role poses a hazard to discretionary nonenforcement
decisions. Discussing SB 1070’s imposition of penalties for noncitizens
144. States to follow Arizona with similar laws include Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South
Carolina, and Utah. See MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 64.
145. The principal drafter of SB 1070 and other laws targeting undocumented noncitizens
was Kris Kobach, the current Kansas Secretary of State. Kobach was the chief immigration
advisor to former Attorney General John Ashcroft and had a temporary stint as a law
professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City before his current position. See Anna
Gorman, A Voice for Tough Immigration Laws, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1; John
Hanna, Kan. Lawyer is Architect of Many Immigration Laws, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May
10, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2010/may/10/kanlawyer-is-architect-of-many-immigration-laws/ [http://perma.cc/2DT7-AHVU].
146. See Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 31, 31 (“Enforcement redundancy, as we might call it, is the norm.”); id. at
34–43; David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV.: IN BRIEF 41, 42 (2012)
(“Arizona argued that its law is different, because it simply mirrors the federal obligation,
punishing only those who could be punished by federal authorities . . . .”); see also Ernest A.
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253. The “mirror image” theory appeared to carry some
weight in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011), in which a
divided Court upheld a different Arizona law requiring employers to use a federal database
to check all employees’ work authorizations, even though federal law does not make the
verification system mandatory. Ultimately, however, what mattered most to the majority in
Whiting was that the federal law at issue, while expressly preempting state employer
sanctions, contained an explicit carve-out allowing states to use “licensing and similar laws”
to penalize employers who unlawfully hire undocumented workers. Id.
147. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
148. Id. at 2507–10.
149. Brief for the United States at 14, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (emphasis
added).
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who have not complied with the federal registration requirement, for
example, the Government argued that
[t]he State cannot, in the name of enforcing a federal registration
obligation that runs between individual aliens and the National
Government, claim the right to punish aliens who are not registered but
who the Executive Branch has decided not to prosecute based on
important considerations consistent with the INA.150

Throughout its briefs, the Government continued in a similar vein,
arguing that uninvited state enforcement of federal immigration laws
threatens federal authority to “justly administer[]” the law, including
through discretionary authority to consider “humanitarian” or similar
factors when deciding whether to remove or detain deportable
noncitizens.151 At oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli
likewise reiterated at many points the potential conflict between a federal
decision not to enforce the law against a particular noncitizen and the state’s
arrest and prosecution of that noncitizen for federal immigration
violations.152
It is important to recognize that by pressing the need to protect
discretionary nonenforcement so concretely, the Government also conveyed
its belief that this understanding of the removal system’s institutional
design should warrant constitutional protection. Despite the unusual nature
of this preemption argument,153 the Court appears to have agreed. The
majority’s analysis in the Arizona case frequently connects its preemption
rulings to its perception that the Executive’s control over enforcement
decisions is critical to the implementation of equity in the removal
system.154
Public statements also reflect the Administration’s awareness of the
connection between enforcement discretion and equity in the removal
system. Regarding DACA, for example, President Obama has stressed that
DHS’s consideration of nonenforcement discretion for noncitizens meeting
the criteria is about keeping immigration enforcement “humane” and
making equitable distinctions regarding how best to use the agency’s

150. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 15, 18–19, 22, 25, 31–33, 48–50, 53–54; Brief for the United States in
Opposition at 25–28, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182).
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, 38, 41, 43, 45, 49, 57–58, 70–71, Arizona, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182).
153. See Cox, supra note 146, at 33 (arguing that allowing executive nonenforcement
discretion to displace state law represents “a radical departure from conventional approaches
to preemption”); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8
DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 87 (2013) (“[N]onbinding executive enforcement
policies cannot, and should not, preempt subfederal law.”).
154. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“A principal feature of the removal system is the
broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2502–06. See
generally Cade, supra note 51 (arguing that the Court has taken a number of opportunities in
recent years to structurally preserve possibilities for equitable balancing in the enforcement
of immigration law).
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The Administration frequently
limited enforcement resources.155
characterizes DACA as “the right thing to do” and as in line with “our
values as a nation.”156 In former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano’s words, “Our nation’s immigration laws must be enforced in a
firm and sensible manner. But they are not designed to be blindly enforced
without consideration given to the individual circumstances of each
case.”157
Similarly, when announcing new prosecutorial discretion initiatives in
late 2014, President Obama stated that they “will help make our
immigration system more fair and more just.”158 Internal agency memos
also acknowledge the critical link between prosecutorial discretion and the
“fairness of the removal process.”159
155. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration (arguing
that DACA will make the immigration system “more fair, more efficient, and more just”)
[http://perma.cc/7S66-PAUR].
156. See, e.g., Jay Carney, White House Press Sec’y, Statement on the First Anniversary
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process (June 15, 2013), www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2013/06/15/statement-press-secretary-first-anniversary-deferred-actionchildhood-ar (“A year ago today, the Administration took up the cause of ‘Dreamers’ and
took action to make our immigration system more representative of our values as a nation.”)
[http://perma.cc/7KXR-KG7W]; Jay Carney, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing (June
21, 2012), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/21/press-briefing-press-secretaryjay-carney-62112 (stating that immigration prosecutorial discretion is aimed at “ensuring
that we are enforcing the law in a way that makes the right decisions in terms of priorities,
and does not unfairly and unnecessarily punish people”) [http://perma.cc/8BD2-HSVE];
Press Release, Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Secretary Johnson Announces
Process for DACA Renewal (June 5, 2014), www.uscis.gov/news/secretary-johnsonannounces-process-daca-renewal (“By the renewal of DACA, we act in accord with our
values and the code of this great Nation.”) [http://perma.cc/SX33-X53T]; Obama, supra note
155 (repeatedly describing DACA as “the right thing to do”); see also Transcript: President
Obama’s Full NPR Interview, NPR (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/
29/372485968/transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview (“If your view is that
immigrants are either fundamentally bad to the country or that we actually have the option of
deporting 11 million immigrants, regardless of the disruptions, regardless of the cost, and
that that is who we are as Americans, I reject that.”) [http://perma.cc/6W8M-8DG6].
157. Press Release, Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., (June 15, 2012),
www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-processyoung-people-who-are-low [http://perma.cc/84UZ-MD7N].
158. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (Nov. 25, 2014),
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/25/remarks-president-immigration-chicago-il
(“[T]here have been times where families got broken apart—while I’ve been President. And
it’s heartbreaking. That’s not right.”) [http://perma.cc/K5UV-MYMG]; see also Senator
Charles Schumer, Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1, Part 1, C-SPAN (Jan. 28,
2015), www.c-span.org/video/?323993-1/us-attorney-general-nominee-confirmation-hearing
(“Doesn’t it make sense to have a general rule . . . in an office with limited resources to go
after bank robbers before you go after shoplifters?”) [http://perma.cc/Y5V3-DJMU];
Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Texas v. United States, 787
F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238) (“In short, the preliminary injunction is a sweeping
order that extends beyond the parties before the court and irreparably harms the Government
and the public interest by preventing DHS from marshalling its resources to protect border
security, public safety and national security, while also addressing humanitarian interests.”).
159. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enf’t, to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel 8 (Oct. 24,
2005),
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/

2015]

ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY

687

B. Implementation
This section outlines three ways that the current Administration has
endeavored to implement equitable immigration enforcement: distribution
of resources to high priority targets, more systematic prosecutorial
discretion in individual cases, and initiatives that allow noncitizens meeting
particular criteria to affirmatively apply for a temporary deferral of
removal.
1. Shifting Resources
Targeted resource distribution can work as a means of increasing the
likelihood of equitable enforcement. Whereas the immigration agencies
under President George W. Bush focused on workplace and home raids,160
the current Administration has directed most of its enforcement resources
toward the apprehension and removal of recent or repeat immigration
violators and noncitizens with criminal history, in keeping with the
agency’s expressed enforcement priorities.161 While not all deportations of
noncitizens in these groups will be justifiable, targeted resource choices
lessen the probability of enforcement against individuals in non-targeted
groups, whom the government reasonably may believe are most likely to
present significant equitable claims.
Agency data show that over the last decade, and particularly in the last
few years, the percentage of total removals deemed “border removals” has
dramatically increased.162 In 2011, for example, there were 387,134 total
recorded removals,163 with just over half coded as border removals.164 In
enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/22092975-ICEGuidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05.pdf/view
(“Prosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool that sometimes enables you to deal with
the difficult, complex and contradictory provisions of the immigration laws and cases
involving human suffering and hardship.”) [http://perma.cc/6WVK-BDZ7]; see also
Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et
al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Policies Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
47CA-UYQG]; Morton Priorities Memo, supra note 12; Memorandum from John Morton,
Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge &
Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention & Removal of Aliens
4–5 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Discretion Memo], http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
[http://perma.cc/293ECVA8].
160. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 511–21.
161. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 1; Morton Priorities Memo,
supra note 12, at 1–3; Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 4–5.
162. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2010 4, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar2010.pdf (setting forth data on expedited and reinstated removal proceedings from 2001 to
2010) [http://perma.cc/2KFE-J5KW]; SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5–6 (setting forth data on
expedited and reinstated removal proceedings from 2011 to 2013).
163. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6.
164. Alex Nowrasteh,Updates on President Obama’s Immigration Enforcement Record,
CATO INST. (Oct. 17, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/updates-president-obamas-
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2012, there were 418,397 total removals,165 of which 61 percent were
border removals and 39 percent were interior removals.166 As a portion of
the record-setting 438,421 total removals in 2013,167 border removals
climbed to 70 percent.168 These numbers show a clear trend toward
increased emphasis on removals at the border. Unsurprisingly, then, in
recent years over 20 percent of DHS’s total budget has gone to the Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP)—twice the amount apportioned to ICE.169
Furthermore, in November 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson indicated that
the DHS will direct even more resources to the border in the future.170
Prioritizing border enforcement recognizes that, generally speaking,
noncitizens who have already been living inside the United States are more
likely to have developed ties and relationships that militate against removal.
While not all noncitizens already living in the U.S. interior will have a
strong normative claim to remain despite clear deportability, many will
have developed connections that at least should be considered. By focusing
a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on recent immigration
violators, the current Administration takes what might be considered a
probabilistic approach to equitable deportations.
immigration-enforcement-record-0 (noting that 51 percent of removals in FY 2011 were
border removals, while 48 percent were deemed interior removals) [http://perma.cc/U7STBK5C]; see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 3, 5, 7 (noting that in FY 2011, CBP was
responsible for 50.1 percent of all Apprehensions, 18.8 percent of all Removals, and 76.1
percent of all Returns).
165. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6.
166. Nowrasteh, supra note 164; see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 3, 5, 6 (noting that
in FY 2012, CBP was responsible for 54.3 percent of all Apprehensions, 17.4 percent of all
Removals, and 72.8 percent of all Returns).
167. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6.
168. Nowrasteh, supra note 164 (noting that approximately 70 percent of Removals in FY
2013 were border removals, while approximately 30 percent were deemed interior
removals); see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5, 6 (noting that in FY 2013, CPB was
responsible for 63.5 percent of all Apprehensions, 24.6 percent of all Removals, and 80.2
percent of all Returns).
169. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2016 9 (2015),
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf (noting
that for FY 2016, 21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $64,858,484,000 is to be allocated to
CBP, while 10 percent will go to ICE and 6 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/VHX5K2TQ]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2015 5 (2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB.pdf (noting that for FY 2015,
21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $60,918,787,000 was allocated to CBP, while 9 percent
went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/XN6S-CBDA]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2014 5 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%2
84%29.pdf (noting that for FY 2014, 22 percent of DHS’s total budget of $59,959,337,000
was allocated to CBP, while 9 percent went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS)
[http://perma.cc/3VHA-STBC]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR
2013 23 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf
(noting that in FY 2013, 21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $59,032,346,000 was allocated
to CBP, while 10 percent went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/6GT7TMBE].
170. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Southern Border and
Approaches Campaign (Nov. 20, 2014).
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With respect to interior removals, the Obama Administration has
committed itself to the detection, apprehension, and removal of noncitizens
who encounter criminal justice systems.171 The immigration agency
currently operates multiple enforcement initiatives to identify noncitizens
who encounter state and local criminal justice systems. The most important
are the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) (formerly known as Secure
Communities), the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and the so-called
“287(g) programs.” Since 2008, federal funding for these interior
enforcement programs has far exceeded half a billion dollars per year.172
The largest and most integrated program is PEP.173 PEP ensures that
when local police submit arrestees’ fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to check for criminal background and outstanding warrants,
the prints automatically get forwarded to DHS to facilitate identification of
persons who might be deportable.174 Although DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
announced in November 2014 that certain aspects of PEP would be
retooled, along with dropping the program’s former name, its key feature of
screening every arrested noncitizen for potential enforcement remains in
place in almost every jurisdiction in the country.175
Meanwhile, CAP’s 8000 officers supplement PEP by checking inmate
roster data provided by correctional departments against immigration
databases.176 These officers also use in-person and virtual interviews to
detect deportable foreign-born detainees in prisons and jails throughout the
country.177 Similarly, section 287(g) agreements deputize local criminal
171. See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, In Change, Mayor Backs Obstacle to Deportation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A19 (“[T]he Obama administration has placed a priority on deporting
noncitizen criminals who pose a threat to the public, while focusing less on illegal
immigrants who do not pose a threat.”); Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at A1 (quoting
President Obama as saying that immigration authorities are going after “criminals, gang
bangers, people who are hurting the community, not after students, not after folks who are
here just because they’re trying to figure out how to feed their families”); Press Release,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border
Security & Immigration Enforcement (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/
05/secretary-napolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration
(“We
established, as a top priority, the identification and removal of public safety and national
security threats. To execute on this, we expanded the use and frequency of investigations
and programs, like Secure Communities, that track down criminals and gang members on
our streets and in our jails.”) [http://perma.cc/P7RG-5RE6].
172. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 24 (2013).
173. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Secure
Communities (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Secure Communities Memo]; Cade,
supra note 58, at 1764–66 (describing the relative size and integration of the Secure
Communities Program, PEP’s predecessor).
174. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 15 (discussing the program when it
was still called Secure Communities).
175. Johnson Secure Communities Memo, supra note 173 (explaining that the program
formerly known as Secure Communities will remain in place but with a new name and
modifications such as eliminating the detainer program).
176. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 14–15.
177. Id. at 14; see also Declaration of Jamison Matuszewski ¶¶ 18–22, at 6–8, Am.
Immigration Council v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 12-00355 (D. Conn. July 12, 2012).
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justice officials to interview and screen foreign-born inmates or detainees
using the same immigration databases as those checked by federal CAP
officers.178 In recent years, the use of 287(g) programs has declined, as
other programs have grown in importance. Even so, as of August 2015,
ICE has thirty-two 287(g) agreements in place in sixteen states.179
Together, PEP, CAP, and 287(g) programs allow federal immigration
officials to screen virtually every inmate in every jail or prison in the
country. Furthermore, a number of states and localities have enacted
legislation authorizing or mandating local law enforcement’s participation
in the deportation scheme.180 DHS is obligated to “respond to an inquiry by
a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain
the citizenship or immigration status” of any person, and the agency
accordingly maintains a Law Enforcement Support Center that fields calls
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, from any law enforcement
officer.181
If a noncitizen who is identified through one or more of these federal (or
state) programs appears to fall within an enforcement priority, ICE makes a
discretionary decision whether to initiate removal proceedings.182
Immigration enforcement priorities are somewhat variable, but generally
include prior criminal records, immigration violations, or the seriousness of
an arrest charge.183 However, no federal law or policy constrains ICE
officers from initiating proceedings in cases against noncitizens believed to
be deportable where such negative factors are absent.184
These programs have been highly successful at channeling noncitizens
who encounter the criminal justice system into removal proceedings. Not
only are the total removal numbers under President Obama the highest in
history,185 but a higher percentage of those deportees are “criminal

178. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 16.
179. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8ASWGAUQ].
180. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-6 (Supp. 2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (2012);
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100(b) (2013); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-4 (LexisNexis 2013); S.C.
Code Ann. § 17-13-170 (Supp. 2012); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-100 to -109 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013).
181. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012).
182. Cade, supra note 58, at 1763–66; Motomura, supra note 52.
183. See Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4; Morton Priorities Memo, supra
note 12, at 3.
184. But see Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times
of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1259 (2015) (arguing that the PEP memo’s
requirement that rank-and-file officers obtain permission from supervisors to go outside of
the priorities may provide such a constraint).
185. See Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/node/21595902/ (“America is expelling illegal immigrants at
nine times the rate of 20 years ago; nearly [two million] so far under Barack Obama, easily
outpacing any previous president.”) [http://perma.cc/R6RZ-8NFZ]. From 1892 to 2007, the
U.S. government deported about two million individuals in total—a figure that has been
doubled in the past seven years. Elise Foley, Obama Deportation Toll Could Pass 2 Million
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aliens.”186 To put the current regime in perspective, consider that between
1908 and 1980, the United States deported only 56,669 criminal aliens, out
of 812,915 total deportations during that seventy-three year period.187
From 1991 to 1996, criminal alien removals saw a substantial increase,
numbering 134,705 criminal removals out of 284,803 total over that
period.188 While the agency under President George W. Bush’s two terms
saw steady increases in criminal removal,189 under President Obama’s
Administration the number skyrocketed. In recent years, the deportation of
noncitizens with criminal history averages almost 200,000 out of a total of
approximately 400,000 removals each year.190
Notably, these numbers do not distinguish by severity of crime. Closer
scrutiny of criminal alien removals shows that traffic offenses, crimes of
migration (illegal entry or reentry), and low-level drug possession make up
the vast majority of deportations of persons the agency deems criminal.191
Indeed, removals based on traffic convictions have increased ten-fold in the
past ten years, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the increased
Nevertheless, by focusing interior
“criminal alien” removals.192
enforcement efforts on apprehending noncitizens following convictions or
other encounters with the criminal justice system, the Administration has
increased the likelihood that those put into the removal system will have
negative factors that potentially justify their deportation.
2. Case-By-Case Discretion
While prosecutorial discretion guidance has been in place since the
1970s,193 recent policy leaders have established more detailed and
transparent enforcement priorities, with the ostensible goal of concentrating
at Current Rates, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/01/31/obama-deportation_n_2594012.html [http://perma.cc/P3P7-CNEB].
186. See supra note 24 (describing DHS’s definition of “criminal aliens”).
187. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 187 tbl.67, http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf (indicating that between 1908 and 1980,
48,330 noncitizens were deported for “criminal violations” and another 8339 were deported
for “narcotics violations”) [http://perma.cc/94VP-PN8G].
188. Id. at 178 tbl.63.
189. During President Clinton’s second term and President Bush’s two terms, total
criminal removals rose significantly each year, but actually shrank as a percentage of total
removals, as noncriminal removals skyrocketed, especially under President Bush. See
generally MARC R. ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE
DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 38–39 fig.13
(2014) (discussing removal data from DHS between 1993 and 2012).
190. See SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6 tbl.8 (showing 198,394 criminal removals out of
438,421 total removals in FY 2013; 200,143 criminal removals out of 418,397 total in FY
2012; and 188,964 criminal removals out of 387,134 total in FY 2011).
191. Id.; MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
DEPORTATION AND DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 20
(2014); Eagly, supra note 54, at 1218; Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV.
809, 833 (2015).
192. Eagly, supra note 54, at 1218.
193. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 246 (2010); Wildes, supra note 50.

692

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

DHS’s limited enforcement resources on the most important targets.194 In
2011, then-ICE Director John Morton began rolling out a high-profile
initiative to encourage a more systematic use of prosecutorial discretion
throughout the agency.195 Over the next year, agency leaders issued a
series of memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be
balanced in the exercise of discretion, designating categories of persons
warranting special consideration and providing for scenario-based training
programs.196 Although the agency has tinkered with the language of the
enforcement priorities over time, the consistent focus is on noncitizens with
criminal records or indicia of a threat to public safety, as well as those who
have recently or egregiously violated the immigration laws.197
These memos establish that noncitizens who do not fall within a priority
for removal should be considered for prosecutorial discretion. The
guidelines for discretion are typically in the form of nonexhaustive lists of
positive and negative considerations, including “the person’s ties and
contributions to the community, including family relationships,”198 the
severity and recentness of any convictions, and “compelling humanitarian
factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill
relative.”199
These enforcement discretion guidelines directly hone in on
considerations of proportionality and personal mitigation. In so doing, they
attempt to compensate for an immigration system in which grounds for
194. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159 (establishing “new policies for the
apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens in this country”); Morton Priorities Memo,
supra note 12 (stating the agency’s tiered removal priorities).
195. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 1.
196. See id.; Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent to All Chief Counsel, Office of the
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t 2 (Nov. 17, 2011); U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/
pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf [http://perma.cc/8P7D-AMQ9].
197. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4; Morton Priorities Memo,
supra note 12, at 1–3.
198. Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 4 (“When weighing whether an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be warranted for a given alien, ICE officers, agents,
and attorneys should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . the
person’s ties and contributions to the community, including family relationships.”).
199. Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 5–6 (“DHS personnel should consider
factors such as: . . . extended length of time since the offense of conviction; length of time in
the United States; military service; family or community ties in the United States; status as a
victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; or compelling humanitarian
factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill relative.”);
Morton Priorities Memo, supra note 12; see also Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec.
Assoc. Dir., Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor & James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir.,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs., Chief Counsel & Special
Agents in Charge, Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion Memoranda to Certain Family
Relationships (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf. [http://perma.cc/3JYE-SMYR]; Memorandum from
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to All Employees (June 15, 2012),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people-morton.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BV7U-YML9].
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removal sweep broadly and retroactively, opportunities to lawfully adjust
status are tightly constrained, and immigration judges have little power to
set aside deportation on equitable grounds.
However, it remains unclear whether the prosecutorial discretion
guidelines will meaningfully impact the equity of the removal system.
From the outset, large factions of the agency’s rank and file have railed
against the initiative.200 In 2012, a group of ICE officers, represented by
Kris Kobach,201 sued their own agency, arguing that requiring them to
consider prosecutorial discretion forced them “to break the law.”202 The
lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was Chris Crane, the president of the National
ICE Council, which represents a union of ICE officers.203 Although the
lawsuit was eventually dismissed, the ICE union refused to allow its 7700
members to engage in any agency training on the use of prosecutorial
discretion.204 Crane’s public remarks reveal the narrow view of many ICE
agents regarding the use of arrest and charging discretion as a means of
implementing equity in the deportation system: “[C]harge (the suspect) as
being in the United States illegally and let the judge sort it out. . . . That’s
our place in the universe. . . . We’re supposed to make arrests and let the
judges and the legal system sort through the details.”205
The agency’s trial attorneys seem to have haphazardly followed the
prosecutorial discretion initiative. Between October 2012 and August 2014,
ICE prosecutors closed a total of 38,439 removal cases in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion following Director Morton’s guidelines.206 To be
sure, that represents a significant increase in the number of closures based,
ostensibly, on equitable considerations. However, as a percentage of the
total cases pending in immigration court, these closures are only a tiny drop
in the bucket. Nationwide, since 2008, the number of persons facing formal
200. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 52, at 233–34.
201. See supra note 145 (describing Kris Kobach’s professional background).
202. See Alan Gomez, ICE Agents Sue Own Agency Over Deferred Deportations, USA
TODAY, Aug. 24, 2012, at 8A.
203. Id.
204. Julia Preston, Agents’ Union Delays Training on New Policy on Deportation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, at A15. Another 9000 ICE agents are not in Crane’s union but rather
are represented by the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, which has been less
confrontational with the Obama Administration over the use of prosecutorial discretion. Julia
Preston, For Deportation Officer, a Single-Minded Mission to Block an Immigration Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2013, at A14. A new lawsuit, however, brought in late 2014 by the
supervising attorney of a regional ICE office, reveals the continued tensions within the
agency’s ranks over the appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion in deportation
proceedings. Julia Preston, Suit Previews Turmoil That Immigration Overhaul May Cause Its
Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2014, at A21.
205. Todd Starnes, ICE Agents: Obama Won’t Let Us Arrest Illegals, FOX NEWS RADIO,
http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/exclusive-ice-agent-faces-suspension-forarresting-illegal-alien.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/MU3C-FX2D].
206. See Cade, supra note 11, at 31–34. More recently, the use of prosecutorial discretion
may be declining slightly; in the period between October 2013 and August 31, 2015, 29,869
cases were closed as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Immigration Court Cases
Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion/compbacklog_latest.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/75S7-W4UW].
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removal proceedings has dramatically climbed each year, reaching more
than 400,000 in both 2014 and 2015 (more than double the number of
pending cases under any prior administration).207
More critically, as I have shown elsewhere, the use of prosecutorial
discretion by ICE attorneys varies wildly throughout the country, with just
five out of approximately eighty immigration court jurisdictions
representing more than half of all case closures tracked since October
2012.208 Similarly situated jurisdictions have dramatically different
discretionary closure rates.209 There is also anecdotal evidence that, even
when administrative closure is offered, many ICE attorneys do so “not to
buffer overly harsh applications of immigration law in low-priority cases,
but rather to avoid having to litigate hearings when the noncitizen may be
eligible for more far-reaching relief.”210 To the extent this is the case,
prosecutorial discretion closures may be less about compensating for
equitable deficiencies in the removal system and more about reducing
government attorney workload, or, even more cynically, bargaining riskaverse noncitizens who have strong equitable claims down to unfavorable
results.211
3. Categorical Discretion (DACA and DAPA)
President Obama’s announcement of DACA in 2012 represented a shift
toward more systematic and categorical implementation of enforcement
discretion.212 Unlike the reactive, case-by-case evaluation that the Morton
initiative asked ICE officers and attorneys to undertake, DACA allows
individuals meeting specified criteria to announce themselves to a
government unit within the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) for a more targeted consideration of their eligibility for equitable
balancing.213 If favorable action is warranted, DACA applicants receive
“deferred action,” which amounts to a revocable assurance that they are not
going to be a priority for deportation for at least two years.214 Although
deferred action confers only legal presence (not legal status), by preexisting

207. See generally Cade, supra note 11, at 31–34.
208. See id. at 31.
209. Id. at 32–33.
210. Id. at 34.
211. Id.
212. See Julia Preston & John Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1.
213. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. Dir. & John Morton, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enf’t Dir. 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/2V7Q-HYFL].
214. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVS. [hereinafter Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals], http://www.uscis.
gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/7TXE-HE6N].
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regulation deferred action recipients are eligible to apply for work
authorization if they can demonstrate economic necessity.215
The newer deferred-action initiatives announced in late 2014 would
operate in similar fashion.216 If implemented, DAPA would allow certain
parents of a U.S. citizen or LPR to affirmatively request consideration for
The 2014
favorable discretion by the USCIS special unit.217
pronouncement also expands DACA to authorize discretionary
consideration for a larger group of childhood arrivals.218 For now,
however, a federal judge has enjoined DAPA and the expanded DACA, and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the federal
government’s bid for a stay of that preliminary injunction.219 The litigation
will likely reach the Supreme Court. If that injunction does not become
permanent, several million unlawfully present noncitizens may be eligible
to seek a temporary, discretionary reprieve from removal.220 Based on
application numbers in the DACA program since 2012, the number of
noncitizens who actually seek deferred action is likely to be much smaller
than stated estimates.221 Even so, these recent steps illustrate the primacy
of enforcement-level decision making in our present-day immigration
system.
Despite its seemingly categorical nature, DACA incorporates key
features that are reflective of prosecutorial discretion. Most important,
agency officers who implement the program must first ensure the equitable
criteria justifying deferral are present and then must assess the totality of the
noncitizen’s circumstances on a case-by-case basis. USCIS weighs relevant
negative factors, such as suspected gang membership, repeated arrests (even
without conviction), document fraud, and so on, against the positive
equities when determining whether to defer removal.222 According to
agency data, as of December 31, 2014, the agency had accepted as properly
215. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015) (allowing agency officials to authorize
work permission for noncitizens who have been granted deferred action and can demonstrate
economic necessity).
216. David Nakamura, Obama Acts to Overhaul Immigration, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
2014, at A1.
217. See Johnson, supra note 2 (inter alia, eliminating the age cap limiting favorable
discretion for DACA to those still under thirty-one at the time of the initiative’s initial
announcement in 2012).
218. Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction [http://perma.cc/JN95-AXDL]. The period
of reprieve was also expanded from two years to three. Id.
219. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
220. Nakamura, supra note 216.
221. See Declaration of Donald Neufeld ¶ 29, at 12, Texas v. United States, 2015 WL
648579 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015) (No. 1:14-CV-254) [hereinafter Neufeld Declaration]
(relaying the agency’s prediction that around 50 percent of those noncitizens potentially
eligible to apply for DAPA will apply in the first eighteen months).
222. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30 (stating that “the DACA program requires case-by-case consideration
of each request and provides for individualized adjudicatory judgment and discretion” and
alleging that DACA applicants have been denied on a discretionary basis due to factors like
suspicion of gang membership or gang-related activity, a series of arrests without
convictions, arrests resulting in pre-trial diversionary programs, ongoing criminal
investigations, or suspected document fraud).
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filed 727,164 out of 770,338 initial requests for deferred action under the
original DACA initiative.223 Of those properly filed requests, 638,897 were
granted deferred action, while 38,597 were denied because of failure to
establish threshold criteria or the presence of negative discretionary
factors.224 As of December 31, 2014, 49,670 initial requests remain
pending.225
To be sure, this is a high approval rate. But that is to be expected in a
program that asks deportable noncitizens essentially to turn themselves in
for removal unless they can prove significant positive equities. Because the
application process for DACA entails the submission of biometric data and
identity documents, background checks, and documentary proof, there is a
“powerful deterrent against individuals with marginal applications from
applying in the first place.”226 Even eligible youth with strong cases may
decline to apply for fear that a later administration would reverse course and
use the data collected to identify and seek to remove them.227
Furthermore, the nature of the equitable criteria required to qualify for
DACA—long residence in the United States, earning or demonstrated
progress toward a high school diploma or equivalent, no criminal record,
being brought to the United States at a young age, et cetera—bring the
current deportation system’s potential for disproportionality into sharp
relief.228 The underlying offense triggering the sanction of deportation (and
a ten year bar on lawful reentry) is noncitizens’ presence in the United
States without authorization, and, in some cases, unlawful entry. Their
personal mitigating factors point toward lack of (or significantly
diminished) culpability, full acculturation as Americans, strong community
ties, high potential for economic productivity, respect for penal laws, lack
of indications of dangerousness, and so on.229 For youth falling within this
group, then, concerns about equity loom especially large and discretionary
223. Id. ¶ 23. The agency rejected 43,174 initial requests for insufficient documentation
or insufficient fees. Id.; see also Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: 2012–
2015, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2014) [hereinafter 2012–2015 USCIS
Report],
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20
Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_performanc
edata_fy2015_qtr1.pdf [http://perma.cc/7VVP-USWG].
224. See Neufeld Declaration, supra note 221, ¶¶ 23–24, 30. The remaining 49,670
initial DACA applications accepted for filing were still pending as of December 31, 2014.
Id. ¶ 23.
225. 2012–2015 USCIS Report, supra note 223.
226. Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of
Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 70
(2015); see also id. at 92 (“[H]igh approval rates cannot by themselves establish that
discretion is not being exercised or that meaningful procedures do not exist, since there is no
legitimate reason to assume that the universe of DACA applicants constitutes a random or
representative sample of all potentially deportable noncitizens.”).
227. Id. at 70.
228. See 2012–2015 USCIS Report, supra note 223.
229. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 176; Roberto G. Gonzales & Leo R.
Chavez, Awakening to a Nightmare: Abjectivity and Illegality in the Lives of Undocumented
1.5-Generation Latino Immigrants in the United States, 53 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 255,
262 (2012).
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nonenforcement can be defensibly applied in a more generalized fashion.
Indeed, categorical proportionality assessment is no stranger to the law.230
In a system lacking back-end proportionality review, the executive agency
charged with enforcing immigration law might reasonably determine that
deporting DACA-eligible persons (or at least those whose cases lack other
indicia suggesting undesirability) is by definition going to be categorically
inequitable.231 To the extent this is accurate, however, it suggests that
DACA cannot justifiably be limited to a one-time program.
That DACA and DAPA bifurcate agency enforcement discretion is also
notable. While ICE prosecutors and agents remain free to exercise
prosecutorial discretion (or not), in this model another set of institutional
actors, housed within a different subagency of DHS, are tasked to look
closely at particular categories of cases that are highly likely to involve
persuasive equitable factors. This institutional design carries with it at least
three significant benefits.
First, by publishing the guidelines and process for allowing deportable
noncitizens to present themselves for consideration of deferred action, the
administration promotes transparency and consistency, two rule of law
values that are often raised as concerns when it comes to agency actions in
general and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in particular.232 Second,
placing responsibility in a unit specifically trained to screen for equities
promotes efficiency gains.233 ICE attorneys are overburdened with too
many removal cases, and there are too few incentives for them to look
closely at any case until shortly before a merits hearing—which is likely to
come nearly two years after the initiation of proceedings, if the noncitizen
can persevere that long.234 Finally, sharing discretionary duties between
two agency bodies adds an extra equitable screen, thereby decreasing the
likelihood that noncitizens with significant humanitarian factors will be

230. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002). See generally Wishnie, supra note 18, 420–22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
categorical proportionality review with respect to certain offenders or certain offenses).
231. Professors Cox and Rodríguez make a related point that in the DACA program, the
central discretionary judgment concerning the removal of DACA-eligible noncitizens has
simply been relocated from DHS’s front line operatives to the agency’s policy heads. See
Adam B. Cox & Christina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (“But rather than eliminating discretion from the system, as
critics charge, constraining low-level decision-makers with rules simply relocates discretion
to a point higher up in the bureaucracy.”).
232. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103–04
(1985) (explaining that agencies are expected to strive for consistent outcomes); Lenni B.
Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law
Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 262–63 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2039 (2008) (arguing that publically accountable enforcement
discretion “promotes consistency”).
233. See, e.g., Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of “Pattern and Practice” Cases: What to
Do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV. 779, 791 (1995) (explaining that
agency efficiency goals include minimizing costs to parties, the government, and taxpayers
and reducing wait times for resolution).
234. See Cade, supra note 11, at 27, 46–54, 77.
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unjustifiably deported.235 Thus, the deferred action programs move beyond
“plenary” delegation of discretionary authority to street-level officers by
clarifying priorities and establishing a layered, transparent agency
framework for administering certain discretionary decisions.236
In short, DACA and DAPA represent the Administration’s most
ambitious attempt yet to manage the equitable responsibility delegated to it
by Congress. Noncitizens who meet the criteria for these programs—lawabiding and productive childhood arrivals or parents of U.S. citizens or
LPRs—are likely to be among the portion of the deportable population
presenting the greatest normative challenge to the operation of the removal
system.237 As the next part explains, however, reliance on executive
discretion alone to ensure that the deportation system remains equitable is
likely to come up short.
III. THE DRAWBACKS AND LIMITS OF EQUITY IN ENFORCEMENT
The executive branch has accumulated vast power over the ground-level
realities of modern deportation law through the establishment of
enforcement priorities and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As
shown in Part II, DHS in recent years has made an effort to systematize
consideration of equitable discretion by enforcement actors, primarily
through targeted resource distribution and prosecutorial discretion
initiatives. Nevertheless, as this part argues, a removal system that

235. There may also be an internal agency management story to tell with respect to
Obama’s large-scale deferred action measures in immigration law, having to do with curbing
“insurrection” by the rank-and-file agents who refused to implement prior agency case-bycase prosecutorial discretion directives. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 205
(“Given this resistance in the field, it took the adoption of DACA as a formal program to
limit unpredictability and arbitrary decisions and to bring some consistency and
predictability to the nationwide pattern of prosecutorial discretion decisions.”); Cade, supra
note 11 (describing implementation difficulties and huge inconsistencies in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion guidelines by ICE attorneys); Ahilan Arulanantham, The President’s
Relief Program As a Response to Insurrection, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/the-presidents-relief-program-as.html [http://perma.cc/
3WD3-EE8Q]; Michael Kagan, The Conservative Case for DACA: The Intriguing Legal
Theory You Won’t Hear on Fox News, SALON (Feb. 19, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.
com/2015/02/19/the_conservative_case_for_daca_the_intriguing_legal_theory_you_wont_h
ear_on_fox_news/ (“President Obama’s immigration actions should be understood as
sensible measures to move power out of the hands of unaccountable civil servants, and
return it to democratically elected officials.”) [http://perma.cc/5UC4-TFRB]; supra notes
194–97, 205.
236. See Kalhan, supra note 226, at 90; see also Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 231, at 75
(“The move to a more rule-bound and centralized regime provided the rule of law benefits
associated with promoting consistency in official decision-making, amplifying political
control and, most importantly, instituting accountability over the enforcement power.”).
237. Of course, as in any regime in which lines of eligibility are drawn, many noncitizens
may not be eligible for DACA and yet present equities warranting discretionary forbearance
of removal. Cf. Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The Dream Act, Immigration Reform
and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 142–48 (2013) (explaining how immigration advocates’
and policy makers’ focus on the “worthiness” of the DREAMers works to disadvantage
noncitizens who fall outside the defined criteria); see also infra Part IV (describing reforms
that might expand equitable scrutiny in a wider swath of cases).
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allocates equitable consideration solely to enforcement actors is likely to
fail to ensure normative justifiability.
In prior work, I have explained why ICE prosecutors may be ill-situated
to parse both the legal merit and normative equities of removal cases.238
Even more than criminal prosecutors, ICE attorneys have training,
experience, and incentives that orient them toward a professional role as
protectors of public safety and national security, largely to the exclusion of
distinctly secondary tasks such as evaluating the equitable merit of
individual cases (at least until very late in the removal process).239 This
“prosecutor bias” is compounded by intense workload pressures that leave
ICE attorneys little choice but to handle their active cases—numbering in
the hundreds—in an assembly-line, if not triage, fashion.240 Other
institutional features raise additional concerns about ICE trial attorneys’
capacity to look closely at the equities of any particular case until the eve of
a hearing. These features include the lack of a right to counsel for indigent
noncitizens, weak rules regarding disclosure of evidence that might be
helpful to the noncitizen, and the absence of a sound structure for ensuring
ICE accountability.241 Notably, the use of appropriate prosecutorial
discretion does not appear to form any part of ICE attorneys’ performance
metrics.242
The Obama Administration avoided many of these problems when it
chose to allocate the responsibility for implementing DACA and DAPA to
the specialized unit within USCIS, rather than to ICE. As we have seen,
ICE’s strong sense of mission and crushing work burdens complicate its
perception and evaluation of normative merits of removal in individual
cases.243 In contrast, USCIS, as the benefits arm of DHS, has extensive
experience in evaluating equities; indeed, that is one of its primary
functions.244 Distributing equitable assessment duties across administrative

238. See Cade, supra note 11, at 46–75.
239. Id. at 47–50; Corcoran, supra note 52; Rabin, supra note 52.
240. Cade, supra note 11, at 50–54.
241. Id. at 59–75. For an argument for right to appointed counsel in deportation
proceedings, see generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent
Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013). For a detailed analysis of discovery asymmetries in
deportation proceedings, see Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror: Discovery
in Immigration Courts, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569 (2014).
242. In response to a FOIA request, in August of 2014 I received a sample of
performance evaluation reports for ICE assistant chief counsel. None of the reports
measured or asked about efforts to exercise equitable discretion or the implementation of the
agency’s prosecutorial guidance. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Performance Evaluation
Reports, FOIA Response (August, 2014) (on file with author). Additionally, in 2013 I
interviewed several ICE trial attorneys who confirmed that prosecutorial discretion plays no
direct part in performance evaluations. See, e.g., Interview with ICE trial attorney in small
Midwestern office (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with author); Interview with ICE trial attorney in
large urban office (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author).
243. See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text.
244. Kalhan, supra note 226, at 95 (“[A]ssigning primary responsibility for deferred
action decision making to the benefits-oriented USCIS . . . places those decisions in an
agency with a different set of institutional responsibilities, incentives, practices, and cultural
norms than the enforcement-oriented ICE.”); Rabin, supra note 52, at 238 (“DACA requires
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bodies (even if both are housed within DHS), at least for particular subsets
of removal cases, may avoid the prosecutorial tunnel vision and
desensitization to the humanitarian aspects of the job that can come to
dominate the culture of law enforcement agencies like ICE.245
Despite this institutional breakthrough, there remain significant
drawbacks to a system that relies heavily on enforcement discretion for
normative justifiability. The next section focuses primarily on the agency’s
failure to engage in equitable balancing when it comes to the removal of
noncitizens with almost any level of criminal history. It then explains how
other factors, such as controversy and lack of finality, also hinder the
effectiveness of enforcement discretion as an equitable tool on a systemic
level.
A. The Criminal History Blind Spot
In one key aspect, the Obama Administration has all but abandoned the
exercise of discretion to inject equity into the removal process—namely, in
removal cases involving persons with criminal histories. To the contrary,
DHS has used criminal history of almost any type as an irrevocable marker
of undesirability. To begin with, the agency’s prosecutorial discretion
guidelines are unavailable to persons with almost any level of conviction.246
So too with the President’s deferred action initiatives. Even persons who
have only misdemeanors on their records typically fall into one of the
agency’s priorities for removal, and DACA is specifically unavailable to
anyone with a “significant misdemeanor,” regardless of other equities or
mitigating factors.247
In addition, the immigration enforcement arms of the federal government
have consistently pushed for the broadest and most severe interpretations of
the criminal removal statutes possible. For example, the government
frequently attempts to bring minor drug crimes within the aggravated felony
category. These efforts, it turns out, have spawned important Supreme

CIS to perform tasks that are central to its mission: review applications for an immigration
benefit, weigh equities, and grant the benefit in accordance with established criteria.”).
245. Bowers, supra note 13, at 1688–91 (discussing how professionalism and experience
can result in “dulled sense” and indiscriminately categorical processes for prosecutors);
Cade, supra note 11, at 47–54 (explaining how ICE’s law enforcement mission has come to
dominate agency culture, coupled with an “unceasing flow of repetitive cases” that may
desensitize some ICE prosecutors); Rabin, supra note 52, at 238 (arguing that the exercise of
“prosecutorial discretion, as administered by ICE, requires the agency to perform an
equitable analysis that directly conflicts with the agency’s law enforcement mission”).
246. See Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159; Morton Priorities Memo, supra note
12; Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159.
247. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 214. Discretionary
programs like DACA and DAPA are also going to be underinclusive of persons with no
criminal history, leaving out many who deserve equitable forbearance of removal but cannot
exactly meet the specified criteria (for example, because they arrived the day after their
sixteenth birthday).
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Court rulings, and these rulings illustrate the front and center importance of
prosecutorial discretion in modern immigration law.248
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,249 decided in 2010, concerned a
noncitizen who faced permanent deportation without possibility of
equitable discretion despite being a longtime LPR and father of U.S.
citizens.250 Jose Carachuri-Rosendo had two convictions: one for simple
marijuana possession and one for unlawful possession of a single Xanax
pill—both misdemeanors under Texas state law.251 On the first charge, he
was sentenced to twenty days in jail.252 The second conviction landed
Carachuri-Rosendo in jail for ten days, after which the government tried to
deport him as an aggravated felon.253 The Government argued that the two
drug crimes would have made Carachuri-Rosendo a felony recidivist drug
offender under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), had he been
prosecuted by the federal government.254 But because no court had ever
charged or found that Carachuri-Rosendo was a recidivist, the Court
unanimously rejected the Government’s slash-and-burn argument.255
In the 2013 case Moncrieffe v. Holder,256 ICE alleged that a longtime
LPR’s first-offender guilty plea to possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana
with intent to distribute was “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”
and therefore an aggravated felony.257 A complex chain of statutes
determines whether something constitutes a federal drug trafficking crime,
but ultimately it must be “an offense that the [CSA] makes punishable by
more than one year’s imprisonment.”258 The problem in Moncrieffe’s case
was that the Georgia statute at issue, like those of many other states, could
be violated whether there was any kind of remuneration,259 and the CSA
treats marijuana distribution as a misdemeanor if the defendant shared a
small amount without compensation.260 Nevertheless, the government’s
default position was to treat all marijuana distribution convictions as
corresponding with the felony distribution offense, regardless of whether
248. See also Cade, supra note 51; Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity (work in
progress on file with author) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in regulating the
modern deportation system).
249. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
250. Id. at 566, 570–71.
251. Id. at 570–71.
252. Id. at 566.
253. Id. Avoiding the aggravated felony ground would allow Carachuri-Rosendo to seek
discretionary relief pursuant to cancellation of removal. See supra Part I.A.
254. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 575–78.
255. Id. at 576–77. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by six other
justices. Id. at 566. Justices Scalia and Thomas each filed separate opinions concurring in
the judgment. Id. at 582, 584.
256. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
257. Id. at 1683 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012)). As discussed previously,
aggravated felonies make noncitizens subject to mandatory detention, ineligible for
discretionary relief from deportation, and permanently prohibited from lawful return to the
United States. See supra Part I.A.
258. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683.
259. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2011).
260. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685–86.
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there was remuneration, and therefore constitutive of aggravated
felonies.261 The Supreme Court rejected this approach, seven to two, and
took the opportunity to chide the Government for its overzealous tactics in
these cases:
This is the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the
Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as “illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance,” and thus an “aggravated felony.”
Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies “the
commonsense conception” of these terms.262

As Justice Sotomayor’s admonition indicates, Moncrieffe and CarachuriRosendo are not isolated examples of government overreach in the criminal
removal cases to have reached the Supreme Court in recent years.263
Moreover, just this past Term, the Court handed down Mellouli v. Lynch,264
which rejected the Government’s argument that a state drug paraphernalia
conviction should be considered a controlled substance removal offense
because it relates to “the drug trade in general.”265 The Government’s
position was particularly strained in this case, because the state drug law
included substances not federally controlled and the “paraphernalia” in
question consisted of a sock.266 Again, the Court emphasized the
incongruity between the relatively minor conviction at issue and the severe
consequence of deportation, noting that under federal law, as well as the
law of nineteen states, Mellouli’s conduct would not even be considered a
criminal offense.267 These concerns came across clearly during oral
argument in the case, which is partly why it was unsurprising to again see
seven justices oppose the Government’s position.268
Indiscriminate use of minor criminal history to impose the drastic
consequences of detention, deportation, and bars to reentry is especially
problematic because of the dire state of our nation’s misdemeanor courts.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1693 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 (2010)).
263. See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (rejecting the government’s
argument that a drug possession conviction punishable only as a misdemeanor under federal
law qualifies as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony simply because it is punishable as a
felony under state law); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (rejecting the
government’s argument that a DUI conviction was a crime of violence and therefore an
aggravated felony).
264. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
265. Id. at 1988.
266. Id. at 1983.
267. Id. at 1985.
268. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980
(2015) (No. 13-1034) (Scalia, J.: “He was convicted of having a sock and you think that’s
more than tenuously related to these Federal drugs.”); id. at 33 (Kagan, J.: “[P]araphernalia
offenses are generally extremely minor offenses; they’re not felonies.”); id. at 47
(Sotomayor, J.: “[U]nder Federal law, this person can’t be convicted for that drug—that’s
not a drug on the Federal list— . . . but can be convicted, under your theory, for possessing
the sock and that non-illicit drug in the sock.”); id. at 50 (Roberts, J.: “[I]t’s because you
give ‘relating to’ such a broad construction that you get . . . the unusual situation . . . that the
State thinks it’s a very minor offense and yet it can become so significant that the person’s
deported.”).
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Following a recent explosion in arrests for low-level offenses, prosecutors
now bring approximately ten million misdemeanor prosecutions each
year.269 These prosecutions churn through court systems in which adequate
representation is scarce, little attention is paid to evidence or individual
equities, and bail and other process costs generally outweigh defendants’
perceived incentives to fight charges.270 The procedural protections in
lower criminal courts are often even more deficient for noncitizens.271
Consequently, the severity of deportation not only outweighs the gravity of
many minor convictions, but such convictions also frequently result from
processes “badly detached from the core legitimating precept of individual
fault.”272
DHS aggressively seeks to remove criminal aliens in other ways, too.
For example, the government has been increasingly utilizing a provision of
the INA that allows the agency to shuffle noncitizens who are not LPRs and
who have convictions that it alone deems to be aggravated felonies into
fast-track “administrative removal” proceedings, where there are even
fewer procedural safeguards available than in regular immigration courts.273
Meanwhile, ICE regularly trains sympathetic prosecutors on the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions in order to help them
maximize the likelihood of deportation.274 And where a local justice
system’s actions are perceived to fall short of the federal government’s
immigration enforcement process—perhaps by allowing an undocumented
noncitizen to bond out of criminal custody during prosecution for a lowlevel offense—ICE sometimes elects to deport the noncitizen while his or
her criminal case is still pending.275
The executive branch also has widely employed detention as part of its
enforcement strategy against noncitizens with criminal history.276 As
described above, in the 1990s Congress made civil detention mandatory for
a wide variety of immigration offenses, and many other persons are subject
269. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009).
270. See, e.g., John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the
Adjudication of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 20 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives
from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
271. See Cade, supra note 58; Chin, supra note 141.
272. Natapoff, supra note 270, at 1319.
273. See SISKIN, supra note 68, at 9–10; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–9 (2014).
274. See Cade, supra note 52, at 186 n.28; Eagly, supra note 54, at 1134 (discussing how
ICE trains local prosecutors regarding conviction types, record clarifications, defense
approaches, and other modifications designed to maximize the chances of removal).
275. See Eagly, supra note 54; supra Part I.A (discussing agency interpretation of the
finality rule).
276. From 1994 to 2011, the number of persons held in civil immigration detention
increased an astonishing 430 percent. See Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform,
92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 127–28 (2013).

704

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

to discretionary detention on the basis of the government’s immigration
charges.277 Indeed, the Obama Administration has easily surpassed
Congress’s detention expectations, as most persons charged with any
criminal grounds of removal are detained in prison-like conditions for part
or all of the pendency of their proceedings.278 In fiscal year 2012, DHS put
477,523 persons in civil immigration incarceration at some point during
their removal process, at a cost of $2 billion to taxpayers.279
Additionally, the Administration has dramatically increased federal
prosecutions for the immigration offenses of illegal entry and illegal
reentry. In fact, federal prosecutions for immigration offenses have
increased almost 60 percent over the past decade, and they made up the
single largest category of federal prosecutions each year from 2008 to
2012.280 There is more to the story than just the numbers, though, as the
government employs criminal immigration prosecutions and civil removal
proceedings as alternative or complementary methods of immigration
enforcement.281
Finally, the Obama Administration relies heavily on increased integration
and communication with local law enforcement agencies both (1) to
identify noncitizens with convictions and (2) to set priorities for
enforcement against the eleven million persons residing in the United States
without authorization.282 The vast bulk of the immigration agency’s
interior enforcement against the undocumented begins with an arrest or
other contact with local law enforcement, which then steers detainees into
the deportation system through PEP or similar federal programs.283 The
key point is that immigration authorities take little, if any, account of the
circumstances of the noncitizen’s arrest or whether she has been prosecuted

277. See supra Part I.A.
278. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM—A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 4–12 (2011); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 120–21
(2015).
279. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT 5 (2013); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT SALARIES AND EXPENSES, FY2013 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 5 (2012).
280. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR
2013 2–3 (2014) (“For the last five years, immigration cases have comprised the largest
single type of serious federal offenses.”).
281. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010).
282. Eagly, supra note 54, at 1139 (“[I]t is clear that it is suspected criminal status, rather
than noncitizen status, that triggers deportation. . . .
[E]ven just a criminal
arrest . . . functions as a selection mechanism for choosing which of the millions of
undocumented residents will be deported.”).
283. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing PEP and other integrated immigration enforcement
programs). Due to its comparative efficiency, Secure Communities (now called PEP) has
been responsible for identifying a significant percentage of interior removals in recent years.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES:
CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED 1 (2012) (attributing 20 percent of ICE removals in 2011 to Secure Communities).
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or convicted. More than a quarter of all noncitizens deported after local
criminal arrest have never been convicted of any crime at all.284
This phenomenon, which Eisha Jain aptly labels “arrests as
regulation,”285 reveals the breadth of the Obama Administration’s
conception of criminal history as a proxy for undesirability. Suspected or
potential criminal status acts as a sorting mechanism, whether or not an
actual conviction ever results. As Adam Cox and Eric Posner have
suggested, a noncitizen’s mere contact with the criminal justice system
raises a red flag for immigration officials and thus represents a rational (or
at least highly efficient) approach to making the most of scarce
resources.286
The problem is that arrests convey next to nothing about culpability.287
One out of every three persons in the United States can expect to be arrested
in his or her life.288 Arrests can be erroneous, and they can be effectuated
for reasons other than the expectation of criminal prosecution.289 Indeed,
the regular use by police of arrests as a tool of social control is now well
understood.290 Even arrest data are often inaccurate.291 Thus, arrest alone,
especially for traffic, public order, or other low-level offenses, does not
reliably indicate anything about dangerousness, assimilability, work
productivity, or other components associated with desirable immigrant
types.292
Using local arrests as triggers for federal enforcement also threatens to
reward racial profiling and other constitutional violations, at least to the
extent that such practices are a part of local law enforcement. Because local

284. Eagly, supra note 54, at 1145–46; see also ROSENBLUM & MEISSNER, supra note 189
(showing that most noncitizens placed in removal proceedings through the jail enforcement
programs have no criminal record or only one misdemeanor).
285. See Jain, supra note 191.
286. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 846 (2007).
287. See generally Jain, supra note 191.
288. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a
National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012) (“Our primary conclusion is that arrest
experiences are common among American youth (most likely on the order of
[approximately] 1 out of 3 by age 23).”).
289. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014) (arguing that New York City’s “managerial” criminal justice
system sorts and regulates a large number of persons through open arrests for low-level and
quality of life offenses, rather than through formal prosecution).
290. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION
OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001). Many arrests are
legitimate, of course, but even legitimate arrests sometimes go unprosecuted because of
prosecutorial priorities and resources, policing mistakes or violations, the unavailability of
witnesses or evidence, and any number of other reasons.
291. Jain, supra note 191, at 832 (describing how arrests are unreliable as data due to
factors like inaccurate or mistaken identification and significant underreporting of
disposition information).
292. See generally Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008)
(discussing the disconnect between arrests and moral culpability).
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actors are responsible for the vast majority of initial encounters between
noncitizens and the government, they have significant influence over the
implementation of immigration enforcement.293 As we have seen, arrested
noncitizens, if unauthorized, are very likely to be placed into removal
proceedings, regardless of whether they are ever convicted or otherwise fall
within a high priority for removal.294 As a result, “sub-federal actors are
able to decisively alter the mix of priority levels that characterize the
deported population through participation in federal-local partnerships, state
criminal law, and ordinary arrest, detention, and charging practices.”295
Of particular importance, police officers making arrests with an eye to
enforcement of federal immigration law, whether through cooperative
relationships or on their own initiative, may have little incentive to comply
with the Fourth Amendment.296 This is largely a consequence of the
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza297 not to apply
the exclusionary rule to civil immigration proceedings, at least absent
egregious violations.298 Because many of these low-level criminal arrests
resulting in deportation never involve criminal prosecutions, constitutional
rights violations go largely unchecked and, therefore, undeterred.299
There is little doubt that modern policing strategies tend to result in
disproportionate arrests of people of color, particularly black and Latino
persons arrested for traffic and “public order” offenses.300 Studies have
293. As Hiroshi Motomura observed in an influential article, the “discretion that matters”
in setting deportation patterns is the discretion to arrest. Motomura, supra note 52, at 1837;
see also MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 128–31.
294. Motomura, supra note 52, at 1836; Elina Treyger, The Deportation Conundrum, 44
SETON HALL L. REV. 107, 148–49 (2014).
295. Treyger, supra note 294, at 149.
296. See generally Cade, supra note 52.
297. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
298. Id. at 1050; see also, e.g., David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary
Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 27–31 (2012); Katie Tinto, Policing the
Immigrant Identity, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
299. See Peter Margulies, Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?: Accountability for Overreaching
in Immigration Enforcement, 6 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 319, 321–22 (2011) (discussing
legislatively and judicially imposed constraints on the availability of civil damages suits in
the immigration context); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and
the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 52, 74–76 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (explaining generally why civil
actions seeking judicial enforcement of rights may have little deterrence value).
300. See, e.g., ACLU OF N. CAL., COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF
POLICING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 16 (2011) (summarizing Ryan Gabrielson’s 2010 report
stating that in a number of California counties, police more frequently set up sobriety
checkpoints to screen traffic in or near Hispanic neighborhoods); ALEXANDER, supra note
290, at 96–106 (arguing that although Latinos and people of color are not actually more
likely to be guilty of drug crimes and other offenses than whites, there are huge racial
disparities in who gets stopped, searched, and arrested); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOPAND-FRISK 2011: NYCLU BRIEFING 2 (2012) (finding that in 2011, blacks and Latinos
accounted for more than 50 percent of police stops in almost every precinct in New York
City and that in thirty-three out of seventy-six precincts, 90 percent of stops were of people
of color); Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot As Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New
Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 593 (2010)
(“Street stops are conducted predominantly in poor neighborhoods with high concentrations
of black and Hispanic residents, at levels that exceed even what local disorder and crime
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suggested this trend may be exacerbated in locations where local law
enforcement officers interact or share overlapping duties with federal
immigration officials through state or local initiatives or cooperative
enforcement programs.301 Both Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations
and formal legal proceedings have revealed the potential for racial profiling
in the policing of immigrants.302 Suspected immigrants may thus be
particularly likely to have been arrested for illegitimate reasons. By using
arrests—whether or not they involve unconstitutional policing tactics—to
trigger regulatory consequences, immigration law capitalizes on (or at least
ignores) racial profiling and other unlawful policing by arresting officers.
There are obvious political reasons for these enforcement choices.303 As
Professor Peter Schuck has observed, “it is hard to imagine a higher
enforcement priority” than targeting noncitizens with criminal history.304
To be sure, criminal history provides the government with information
about factors relevant to membership choices, such as respect for law,
Accordingly,
dangerousness, economic productivity, and so on.305
prioritizing noncitizens who have had run-ins with law enforcement is seen
as an efficient means of sorting a very large pool of potential enforcement
targets.306 But, critically, the Obama Administration’s categorical approach
to noncitizens with criminal history means that the INA’s overly broad and
severe provisions will fail to be tempered by equity.

conditions would predict, and marijuana arrests are clustered in many of the same
neighborhoods . . . .” (citations omitted)).
301. See, e.g., EDGAR AGUILASOCHO ET AL., MISPLACED PRIORITIES: THE FAILURE OF
SECURE COMMUNITIES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 16–18 (2012) (noting increased racial
profiling in policing following the implementation of the Secure Communities program);
TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE,
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN
PROGRAM 1 (2009) (“[I]mmediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour
access . . . to ICE in the local jail, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses—
particularly minor traffic offenses—rose dramatically.”); see also Cade, supra note 52;
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1543, 1546–50 (2011).
302. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825–26 (D. Ariz. 2013); Cade,
supra note 52, at 181–82 (summarizing DOJ investigations and lawsuits against law
enforcement agencies in Maricopa County, Arizona, Alamance County, North Carolina, and
New Haven, Connecticut, on the basis of unconstitutional police practices targeting
suspected noncitizens).
303. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007) (“Across
all kinds of institutional settings, people are seen as acting legitimately when they act to
prevent crimes or other troubling behaviors that can be closely analogized to crimes.”). See
generally Hernández, supra note 54.
304. Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
57, 72–74 (2007); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, OFFICE OF THE DIR., ICE
RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5 (2012) (stating that enforcement efforts against criminal aliens build on “broad consensus
in the nation that persons convicted of serious crimes who are in the United States illegally
should be subject to deportation”).
305. Cox & Posner, supra note 286, at 826–27, 846.
306. Id.
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This Article does not take a position here regarding how the federal
government should evaluate the equities in cases involving noncitizens
convicted of, or arrested for, crimes. The point is that some balancing
should take place in individual cases, even for “criminal noncitizens,” to
safeguard against injustice and arbitrary action in the removal system.307
While Congress, and probably most of the public, might want ICE to have
broad capacity to seek removal of dangerous individuals, it does not follow
that all removals of noncitizens with criminal history are justified.308 An
LPR family man running a small business who pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor marijuana offense long ago presents different equitable
considerations than a recently convicted rapist with few community ties—
yet both might be removed without any opportunity for discretionary relief
or lawful opportunity to return. An intoxicated person arrested after driving
into a school bus occupies a morally distinct position from an elderly
woman arrested for selling tamales in a parking lot; yet, if they are
undocumented, both may become priorities for removal through the
operation of the deportation machinery.309
In short, not all noncitizens with convictions or arrests are similarly
situated. Removal of many noncitizens with criminal history will be
appropriate, but for others it will be unjustifiably harsh in light of the
relatively minor nature of their conduct and individual mitigating factors
like rehabilitation, length of time in the United States, community and
family ties, health concerns, age, and so on.310 Even unlawfully present
noncitizens with criminal history will sometimes present circumstances that
warrant forbearance of removal on proportionality grounds.311 While
criminal history may be a reasonable enough way to establish deportation
priorities, more than roughshod sorting is required for a system
307. Cf. KANSTROOM, supra note 11, at 219 (arguing that because European law requires
balancing of private and public interests in deportation cases, the system “preserves an
important measure of respect for human rights norms and a powerful safeguard against
arbitrary government actions”).
308. In a related context, Professor Liz Keyes has thoughtfully examined how
immigration judges rely on facile dichotomies and stock narratives to distinguish between
“good” and “bad” immigrants, failing to consider the individual equities of those falling in
the latter group. See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and
the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207
(2012).
309. See Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Don’t Deport the “Tamale Lady”, CNN (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/01/opinion/navarrette-deportation-sacramento/
(describing
how the mother of two U.S. citizens who was selling homemade tamales in a Walmart
parking lot was arrested for trespassing and then put into immigration proceedings)
[http://perma.cc/DCR2-F9BQ].
310. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64 (reporting that
the INS before 1996 understood that noncitizens subject to removal on criminal history
grounds included “a vast spectrum of human character and behavior . . . [and that] a large
fraction of this class made single mistakes or had shown genuine rehabilitation and
remorse”).
311. See Wishnie, supra note 18, at 428–31 (arguing that removal orders and bars on
reentry must be understood as penalties in many cases and therefore must comport with
proportionality in light of the noncitizen’s individual circumstances).

2015]

ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY

709

administering such severe penalties to be just. At the center of every
deportation case, there is an individual who may have formed deep
community bonds of family, faith, employment, and friendship. And where
this is true, deportation portends life-altering consequences both for that
individual and for the family members, persons, and institutions at the other
end of those connections.312 For the expansive deportation provisions in
the immigration code to remain normatively tolerable, the equities and
impact of removal in the individual case must be considered in some
way.313
When administrators rigidly apply overly broad and formally inflexible
rules, they do “not merely fail to do justice, they may do positive
injustice.”314 The Executive’s failure to carefully assess the merits of
deporting individual noncitizens who may have significant equities on the
basis of minor crime raises the specter of injustice. Additionally, the
justifiability of deportation becomes dubious when a noncitizen is brought
into the system through racial profiling or other constitutional violations.315
As this section has explained, the current Administration has failed to
take account of individual fairness concerns when it comes to the removal
of noncitizens with criminal history. Instead, ICE indiscriminately and
aggressively pursues noncitizens with even very minor convictions (or mere
arrests). This approach suggests that allocating the bulk of equitable
authority to law enforcement actors comes with a significant risk that the
deportation system will fail to administer appropriate justice in a large
number of cases.
B. Controversy
Another drawback of relying on enforcement discretion to keep the
deportation system normatively justifiable is that executive actions in this
area tend to arouse significant ire and controversy. States, congresspersons,
or members of the public may not approve of the particular manner in
which the Executive is managing Congress’s delegation of enforcement
power and may attempt to force modifications through legislation or

312. See Banks, supra note 55, at 1293–96 (discussing social science literature
documenting the collateral consequences of deportation for family members left behind).
313. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 87 (1969) (arguing that
“legislation has long been written in reliance on the expectation that law enforcement
officers will correct its excesses through administration”); id. at 25 (“Discretion is a tool,
indispensible for individualization of justice.”); Solum, supra note 13, at 205 (arguing that
equity is essential to the just application of the law).
314. Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the
Individual Specialized Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1960); see also DAVIS, supra note
313, at 25 (“Rules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of
modern government and of modern justice.”); R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas:
The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 214, 217–
18 (2008) (arguing that law and equity are mutually dependent).
315. See Cade, supra note 52 (arguing that ICE trial attorneys have constitutional and
normative obligations to exercise favorable discretion where there have been unchecked
upstream violations of deportable noncitizens’ rights).
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litigation. We have already begun to see this play out in challenges to
President Obama’s most recent discretionary enforcement initiatives.
Responding to one such challenge brought by twenty-seven states, on
February 16, 2015, Judge Hanen of the Southern District of Texas issued a
preliminary injunction halting the rollout of DAPA and the expanded
version of DACA.316 In the district court’s view, the affirmative,
categorical, and large-scale nature of these programs overcame the
substantial case law that typically insulates agency nonenforcement
decisions from judicial review.317 The court found DACA and DAPA to
constitute an agency “rule,” which would subject the agency to the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) formal rulemaking procedures,
including the provision of public notice and an opportunity to comment.318
On May 26, 2015, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit declined to grant the federal government’s request for an emergency
stay of Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction.319
Meanwhile, members of Congress have introduced bills to defund parts
of DHS or otherwise block executive action.320 Some academics have
voiced concerns too, objecting that the initiatives’ scale, prospective
“licensing” of future violations, and grant of the benefit of work
authorization makes them unlike prosecutorial discretion and undermines
the deterrence goals of immigration law.321 Resolving whether DACA and
DAPA are constitutional or consistent with the APA lies beyond the scope

316. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *62 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16,
2015) (order granting preliminary injunction).
317. Id. at *34.
318. Id. at *51. Judge Hanen did not rule on the constitutionality of the executive actions,
though dicta throughout the opinion suggests he has significant concerns about the agency’s
authority to use its discretion in this way. Id. at *55.
319. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 769 (5th Cir. 2015).
320. See, e.g., Immigration Accountability Act, H.R. 206, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015)
(prohibiting the use of Congressional funding to implement or enforce certain exercises of
prosecutorial discretion); Defund Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 155, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015);
Prevention of Executive Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 31, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
321. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105,
177 (2014) (“Prosecutorial discretion has a place in immigration law. It has, however,
historically involved case-by-case decisions, not the blanket relief that DACA affords.”);
Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful
Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1187–92 (2015) (arguing that
programs like DAPA create a “moral hazard” for continuing and future violations of
immigration law); Rubenstein, supra note 153, at 86 (arguing that DACA raises
constitutional concerns because “qualifying immigrants are afforded permission to remain in
the United States and, by default, permission to reside in the states and cities of their
choosing”); McConnell, supra note 3 (Judge Hanen’s “injunction isn’t about prosecutorial
discretion. It is about granting illegal aliens benefits not allowed by law”); Zachary Price,
Two Cheers for OLC’s Opinion, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2014/11/two-cheers-for-olcs-opinion.html (arguing that DACA and DAPA “go beyond
either conventional agency priority-setting or ad hoc deferred action by deeming broad
categories of immigrants presumptively eligible for a prospective promise of nonenforcement”) [http://perma.cc/E5U3-NDC3]; Price, supra note 120, at 761 (arguing that
DACA “removes the risk of enforcement altogether”).
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of this Article.322 For now, it is enough to observe that Congress has both
functionally and explicitly delegated broad responsibility to the Executive
when it comes to setting immigration enforcement priorities,323 and DACA
as implemented retains key features that characterize prosecutorial
discretion.324 Moreover, DACA and DAPA have only retrospective effect,
making their effect on future deterrence highly speculative.325
The key point for present purposes is that these lawsuits, bills, and
criticisms illustrate the distraction and controversy that executive attempts
to systematize equitable discretion in the deportation system can and do
engender. Because of the politically charged nature of immigration issues,
challenges and attacks of this kind are likely to continue and to arise again.
The Obama Administration already has had to expend a great deal of effort
and resources to defend its discretionary enforcement actions against
lawsuits and public criticism, and future administrations likely will take
note of what occurred with DACA and DAPA. The end result may be less
transparency or, worse yet, less equity. Either outcome is out of step with
fundamental values of fairness and proportionality in the American legal
system.
C. Status Quo Equity
Adjudicative equitable relief from removal typically results in finality.
Where the charged noncitizen is unlawfully present, successfully obtaining
adjudicative relief means that he or she is able to adjust to a more
permanent status, through statutory processes like asylum or cancellation of
removal.326 Cancellation is “a durable form of relief,” in Margaret Taylor’s
322. To be clear, I believe that President Obama’s implementation of his immigration
enforcement authority through DACA and DAPA is constitutional. In September 2014, I,
along with 135 other immigration law professors and scholars, signed a letter outlining the
Executive’s authority to use discretion to protect individuals or groups from deportation. See
Letter from 136 Law Professors and Scholars to President (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/TZ9H-53WF].
For recent accounts concluding that DACA and DAPA are within the President’s
discretionary enforcement authority, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 231, Lauren Gilbert,
Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform,
116 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (2013), and Kalhan, supra note 226. For opposing views, see
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781 (2013), Margulies, supra note 321, and Rubenstein, supra note 153, at 85–86,
137–39.
323. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (giving the Secretary of Homeland Security authority
for “establishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens”).
324. See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B.3.
325. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 231, at 82–83.
326. See, e.g., INA § 208(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1) (providing that noncitizens granted
asylum cannot be removed, must be authorized to work, and may travel abroad with consent
of the Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (providing that cancellation of removal for
non-LPRs will adjust the recipient’s status to one “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence”).
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words, amounting to, “essentially, legalization on a case-by-case basis.”327
Similarly, adjudicative success for lawfully present noncitizens facing
deportation generally means that either the government’s removal charges
were unfounded or the person was able to obtain discretionary relief,
perhaps through (re)adjustment of status with a waiver.328 In either
situation, the noncitizen exits removal proceedings with her legal status
intact and faces almost no possibility that charges will be filed again unless
a new triggering event, such as a new conviction, arises.
In sharp contrast, the implementation of equity through enforcement
discretion can do little more than preserve the status quo. Deferred action,
administrative closure, or termination of proceedings typically do not
resolve the underlying issue that triggered the initiation of removal
proceedings. An LPR with a deportable conviction who is offered
administrative closure as a matter of prosecutorial discretion remains
perpetually subject to possible removal. An undocumented youth who
receives a reprieve under DACA remains without legal status (though she
may at least temporarily stop accruing unlawful presence and gain
permission to work). Instead, that person, like many other beneficiaries of
equitable prosecutorial discretion, occupies what Geoffrey Heeren has
called the “status of nonstatus,” which sanctions physical presence without
bestowing rights or benefits and does not offer a path to increased
stability.329
In this respect, prosecutorial discretion in deportation proceedings
achieves something different than its analogue does in the criminal system.
Discretionary decisions not to charge or prosecute are useful in the criminal
system because they do not implicate double jeopardy, and the public might
want prosecutors to be able to reconsider discretionary decisions if new
information arises or priorities change.330 This also may be a benefit of
discretionary forbearance in the deportation system.331 But in the
meantime, the uncharged criminal suspect typically enjoys the same liberty
as one who is tried and acquitted. Moreover, the uncharged suspect is in a
considerably better position than one who has been prosecuted and
convicted, even if the person’s circumstances lead to a mitigated sentence
of probation, community sentence, or time served. And because most
criminal offenses have statutes of limitation, at some point an alleged
offender will know she no longer need fear prosecution.
327. Taylor, supra note 113, at 532.
328. See, e.g., Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding
that a noncitizen who received LPR status after entry and who meets the criteria to readjust
status may seek a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)).
329. Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1129–33 (2015);
see also Jennifer Chacón, Liminal Legality: Developments in Immigration Enforcement
Crime Control and Beyond, 92 DENVER U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the legal
ambiguity of DACA and DAPA).
330. See Bowers, supra note 13, at 1657, 1685.
331. See Interview with ICE trial attorney in small Midwestern office, supra note 242, at
3–4 (describing how, in the exercise of discretion, she sometimes elects not to file a charging
document with the immigration court but retains it in the event that new negative
information about the noncitizen comes to light).
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For deportable noncitizens, on the other hand, the difference between
adjudicative discretionary relief from removal and a favorable exercise of
enforcement discretion is considerable. Receiving deferred action is better
than getting deported (or remaining completely undocumented), but in the
end it amounts to “immigration status purgatory.”332 But because actual
equitable adjudicative relief is now so tightly constrained, it may be an
impossible (or, at best, perilous) course to pursue in adversarial
proceedings. For that reason, even deportable noncitizens with meritorious
cases for relief often accept ICE’s offer of administrative closure rather than
risk venturing to a hearing.333
The bottom line is that even noncitizens who receive a favorable exercise
of prosecutorial discretion remain in legal limbo. As a result, they remain
at higher risk for discrimination and exploitation than persons who have
lawful immigration status. Notwithstanding their contributions to the
economy and tax base, noncitizens who receive favorable prosecutorial
discretion but lack lawful status also remain excluded from healthcare
coverage, social security retirement, and other benefits that are afforded to
noncitizens in lawful status.334 In any system that allowed for a greater
measure of adjudicative discretion, many such noncitizens might actually
be able to regularize their status and fully enter communities that they have
been a part of and contributed to for many years, albeit in the shadows.
Under the current system of executive-administered discretion, however,
even noncitizens with strong equities can expect little more than to remain
in a position of distressing uncertainty and inequality.
IV. IMPROVING IMMIGRATION EQUITY
As this Article has argued, the risk of normative injustice in the removal
system increased substantially when Congress all but wrote out of the
statute adjudicative equitable consideration for both lawfully present and
undocumented noncitizens, while at the same time casting removal grounds
so wide that even LPRs with old, minor convictions—or other criminal
history not even recognized as a conviction by the criminal system—might
find themselves mandatorily detained and then permanently banished.
In recent years, the executive branch has taken some important measures
to preserve equity in our new deportation system. Prosecutorial discretion,
at least in theory, helps ensure that the extreme sanctions of deportation and
bars to lawful reentry are not imposed without individual consideration of
proportionality and fairness. In practice, DHS’s push to encourage ICE
officers and attorneys to evaluate equitable norms when making
enforcement decisions appears to have been somewhat successful in select
jurisdictions but thus far fails to achieve anything close to nationwide
consistency and efficacy.

332. Kalhan, supra note 226, at 68.
333. See Cade, supra note 11, at 33–34, 77–78.
334. See Heeren, supra note 329, at 1165–79.
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DACA represents an important innovation in the use of prosecutorial
discretion to implement proportionality and fairness in the immigration
system. The program reflects the Obama Administration’s reasonable
belief that the deportation of undocumented noncitizens who can establish
specific criteria will categorically be disproportional, at least barring other
indicia of undesirability. The program’s design also capitalizes on a
division of expertise across immigration agencies by allocating equitable
evaluation to specially trained benefits officers in USCIS rather than
enforcement officers within ICE. However, DACA has engendered
significant controversy, and DHS’s efforts to expand the program or
identify other groups deserving of categorical discretion have thus far been
hampered by federal litigation.
Focusing limited enforcement resources at the border and on noncitizens
who encounter criminal justice systems is a defensible, if imperfect,
approach to decreasing the likelihood of disproportionate deportations. If,
in contrast, the Administration were to put its resources into combing
school rosters for undocumented youth, raiding noncitizen’s homes or
workplaces, or policing emergency rooms, the likely result would be an
increased proportion of noncitizens facing removal despite strong bonds,
significant hardship, and fewer negative factors.
Nevertheless, these efforts are thus far inadequate to ensure the system’s
normative justifiability. In particular, recent administrations’ overreliance
on the criminal history proxy means that noncitizens with even minor
convictions and strong equities are unlikely to receive much individualized
consideration regarding the merits of their removal. The following sections
outline a range of legislative and executive reforms that would help restore
(or at least improve) considerations of proportionality and fairness in the
deportation system.
A. Legislative Reforms
Congress bears primary responsibility for the shift in equitable discretion
from adjudicators to enforcers in the modern immigration scheme. The
most direct possibilities for redress also lie with Congress. If federal
lawmakers were to roll back the breadth and severity of the removal
grounds, and restore mechanisms for adjudicative relief from removal for
both lawfully present and undocumented noncitizens, the pressure on the
Executive to adopt measures that ensure that individual deportations remain
proportional and justified would decrease. Toward this end, Congress
should consider implementing the following reforms.
Critically, Congress should narrow the criminal history removal grounds,
which make many lawfully present noncitizens deportable on the basis of
minor offenses, despite deep connections and contributions in this country
and substantial hardships faced abroad. One important step would be to
revise the aggravated felony ground to exclude offenses that do not reliably
indicate that the noncitizen poses a threat to public safety. For example,
offenses designated as misdemeanors under the applicable penal code
should never qualify as aggravated felonies. This would help ensure that

2015]

ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY

715

the severe sanctions associated with aggravated felonies—including
removal without the possibility of discretionary relief and permanent bar on
lawful reentry—are a proportional response, which Congress recognized
when a narrower version of the aggravated felony category was originally
enacted in 1988.335
In general, misdemeanors are insufficiently reliable indicators of
wrongdoing to justify the imposition of severe immigration consequences.
Misdemeanor marijuana possession offenses in particular have become an
increasingly problematic ground on which to base deportation.336 Recently,
several states have legalized the use of marijuana for medical or
recreational purposes, and numerous other states are considering similar
Even in states where marijuana possession remains
measures.337
prohibited, violations typically are lightly sanctioned and often categorized
only as civil infractions.338 At least one in three persons in the United
States has tried marijuana, including our three most recent Presidents.339
Accordingly, Congress should scrutinize this deportation ground and either
expand the limited petty offense exception or do away with removal on the
basis of marijuana possession all together.
Additionally, Congress should consider enacting statutory limitations that
would prohibit removal of lawfully present noncitizens on the basis of very
old convictions. Limiting the possibility of removal to a statutorily
determined period following the date of conviction would account for
youthfulness, redemption, and the accumulation or strengthening of social
bonds in this country over time.340 One route would be to enact a generally
applicable statute of limitation, such as fifteen years, for all removal
offenses. This approach would have the benefit of administrative ease.
Alternatively, Congress might want to calibrate the length of time
appropriate for response based on the underlying seriousness of the
applicable removal offense.
(Perhaps the most egregious removal
offenses—for example, murder, rape, and human trafficking—should not
have a statute of limitations.) Either way, this kind of reform would
decrease the number of lawfully present noncitizens subject to
disproportionate removal in light of the nature of their underlying offenses
and the mitigating factors that typically accrue through significant periods
of time spent living, working, and raising families in this country.

335. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
336. See generally Cunnings, supra note 55.
337. Id. at 522–24 (discussing legalization of recreational marijuana use in Colorado,
Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington D.C., and similar legislation likely to be
proposed in 2016 in Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada).
338. Id. at 526–28; see also Cade, supra note 58, at 1773.
339. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 38 Percent Have Tried Marijuana, Little Changed Since ‘80s,
GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163835/tried-marijuana-little-changed80s.aspx [http://perma.cc/7LVY-TKUQ].
340. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1747 (2011) (“Tying the statute of limitations to the date of conviction
has the advantage of making time for and recognizing redemption, and of accounting for
youthfulness at the time of the crime.”).
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An alternative approach that would address the same concerns would be
to set probationary periods for the applicability of each removable offense.
Congress has long done this with crimes classified as involving moral
turpitude, which can only form the basis for removal of a lawfully present
noncitizen if the offense is committed within the first five years after
admission.341 All criminal history removal offenses could be made
contingent on the same probationary period, or, again, Congress might wish
to calibrate the applicable period based on the egregiousness of the
underlying conviction category. It would be reasonable, for example, to
assign a short probationary period for removal based on minor controlled
substance offenses and a longer period for those convicted of felony drug
trafficking crimes. Like a statute of limitations, this approach would
recognize that after a substantial period of time living in this country,
noncitizens will develop bonds of family, community, faith, and so on that
will generally outweigh the justifiability of imposing deportation in addition
to whatever punishment already has been imposed through the criminal
justice system.
Federal lawmakers should also restore power to adjudicators to determine
whether removal is appropriate in a wider swath of cases than allowed
under current law. First, given today’s extensive connections between the
criminal and immigration systems, it makes sense to reboot the JRAD
mechanism repealed in 1990, which allowed criminal court sentencing
judges to determine whether the additional sanction of deportation would be
unwarranted in an individual noncitizen defendant’s case.342 Similarly,
Congress should enact legislation clarifying that “convictions” that have
been expunged or set aside—whether through diversionary programs,
judicial expungements, or pardons—will not trigger removal grounds.
These changes would help ensure that noncitizens are not deported on the
basis of criminal history that the criminal justice system no longer treats as
a conviction or that a sentencing judge has determined would not warrant
the additional sanction of removal.343
At the federal immigration court level, Congress should reallocate broad
power to immigration judges to balance the equitable fairness of
deportation in individual cases. Cancellation of removal, as defined under
current law, is far too limited to adequately ensure proportionality for both
LPRs and undocumented noncitizens.
Here, too, Congress might
reasonably determine that a range of discretionary relief is appropriate,
depending on factors like the nature of the underlying removal category and
the immigration status of the noncitizen. It might be appropriate to make
discretionary relief from removal somewhat more stringent for
341. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (providing for the
deportation of a lawfully present noncitizen if he or she is (1) convicted of one crime
involving moral turpitude within five years after the date of admission and (2) a sentence of
one year or longer may be imposed). Noncitizens who have been convicted of more than
one crime involving moral turpitude are deportable regardless of the dates of the offenses. 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
342. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
343. See Cade, supra note 88, at 380–81; Cade, supra note 58, at 1758.
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undocumented noncitizens than for those who are lawfully resident, as
under current law. Similarly, Congress might reasonably determine that
noncitizens with egregious criminal histories or other evidence of
significant bad acts have a very high burden to demonstrate that the pain of
deportation outweighs their positive equities. The bottom line, though, is
that a justice system committed to proportionality requires immigration
judges to have adequate power to ensure that removal and corresponding
bars to reentry are normatively justified in all individual immigration cases.
If Congress wishes to ensure that all noncitizens who commit immigration
violations or criminal offenses are penalized in some fashion—in addition
to the sanctions already administered by the criminal justice system—these
concerns could be more appropriately addressed through the enactment of a
graduated system of sanctions (e.g., civil penalties, delays in immigration
benefits, et cetera), which could be calibrated to the specifics of the
individual case.344 In any event, the statutory annual limit on cancellation
grants for non-LPRs should be repealed, as this cap constrains the
availability of relief for many individuals who can meet even the very high
hardship threshold required under current law.345
There is also much Congress should do to improve the procedural
protections currently afforded noncitizens in removal proceedings.
Procedural mechanisms work to help ensure that adjudicators or other
agency decision makers (including prosecutors) have an incentive and
opportunity to consider the merits and equities of individual cases. For
example, lawmakers could give noncitizens facing removal a right to
appointed counsel if they cannot afford an attorney. Recent studies have
shown strong correlations between the assistance of counsel and success in
removal proceedings,346 suggesting that in the modern system, attorneys
play a critical role in helping noncitizens avoid inappropriate removals.
Additionally, Congress could increase statutory obligations on the
government to turn over any evidence in its possession bearing on the
noncitizen’s right to remain.347 Various commentators have argued that
these and other procedural reforms are needed to “see justice done” in

344. Professor Juliet Stumpf has thoughtfully analyzed what such a system might look
like. See Stumpf, supra note 55, at 1728–40.
345. See supra Part I.A; see also Taylor, supra note 113, at 548.
346. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and
Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO (Dec. 2011),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
56W5-XPCK]; Andrea Saenz, The Power of 1000: Updates from the Nation’s First
Immigration Public Defender, CRIMMIGRATION (July 14, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/
2015/07/14/the-power-of-1000-updates-from-the-nations-first-immigration-public-defender/
(“The early data indicate that the presence of NYIFUP counsel increases a detained client’s
chance of success in their removal case ten times over, or by as much as 1000%.”)
[http://perma.cc/8V5E-SC8Q]; Representation Makes Fourteen-Fold Difference in
Outcome: Immigration Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRANSACTIONAL RECS.
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July 15, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396/
[http://perma.cc/G448-METJ].
347. See generally Cade, supra note 11; Heeren, supra note 241.
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removal proceedings.348 While procedural reforms would not directly
remediate the current system’s reliance on executive discretion to ensure
proportionality, they would at least improve the likelihood that noncitizens
who do qualify for the limited forms of discretionary relief still available
will prevail in highly adversarial, deeply backlogged immigration
proceedings.
Finally, legislation providing a path to lawful status for certain groups of
undocumented noncitizens in the United States would alleviate the burden
on executive branch officials to sort among approximately eleven million
deportable persons, many of whom have developed substantial ties in this
country.349 Reform might target specific groups, such as those who have
temporarily benefited from President Obama’s DACA program. Indeed,
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (“the
DREAM Act”), which Congress has considered several times in recent
years and which passed the Senate in 2013, would have done just that.350 If
enacted, the DREAM Act would provide a lawful status for noncitizens
who came to the United States before age sixteen, lived here continuously,
earned a high school diploma or equivalent, attended college or served in
the military for at least two years, and did not have disqualifying
convictions.351 The DREAM Act would thus remove the threat of
deportation for a portion of the noncitizen population with especially strong
equities and little or no personal responsibility for the immigration
violations that make them removable.
Lawmakers should consider other categories of deportable noncitizens
for legalization, as well. For example, Congress may wish to provide a path
to lawful immigration status for law-abiding, productive noncitizens with
U.S. citizen children—another group for whom the sanction and collateral
consequences of deportation often will be excessively harsh. Perhaps
Congress could take an even broader legalization approach and focus
primarily on length of residence in the United States to establish a path to
lawful status for currently present unauthorized noncitizens, as it did with
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.352
348. See CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, TO
FILE OR NOT TO FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR: IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 56–60 (2013); Cade, supra note 11, at 77; Betsy Cavendish &
Steven Schulman, Reimagining the Immigration Court Assembly Line: Transformative
Change for the Immigration Justice System, APPLESEED 17–19, 63–67 (2012); Corcoran,
supra note 52, at 166–73; Heeren, supra note 241, at 1573.
349. More than half of the eleven million undocumented persons currently living in the
United States have been here for over ten years. See, e.g., Oversight of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015)
(written testimony of Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security), http://www.dhs.
gov/news/2015/07/14/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-johnson-house-committee-judiciaryhearing-titled- [http://perma.cc/JND9-64JZ].
350. See DREAM Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2103 (2013); see also DREAM Act of
2011, S. 952, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2011); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of
2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 621–32 (2006).
351. See DREAM Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2103.
352. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 contained two legalization
programs. One was based on residence in the United States since at least January 1, 1982,
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Reforms such as these would help restore proportionality to the
deportation system, decrease pressure on severely overburdened
immigration courts, and eschew much of the controversy and inefficiency
endemic in a system that relies so heavily on executive discretion to ensure
normative justifiability. However, because any categorical legalization
legislation is likely to (1) be retrospective in application, and (2) reflect line
drawing that on some level will be arbitrary, such efforts alone will fail to
ensure that noncitizens with strong humanitarian factors who fall outside
the program’s eligibility requirements can avoid unfair deportations.
Accordingly, Congress should consider enacting the entire panoply of
reforms proposed here, including both legalization for particularly
sympathetic groups and measures that create the structures necessary for
individuation in removal decisions.
It must be acknowledged, however, that such reforms face an uphill
battle. Year after year—for over a decade now—multiple bipartisan efforts
to engineer comprehensive immigration reform have failed.353 Legalization
programs are especially controversial, but even less ambitious immigration
reforms raise political firestorms.354 Even if a future Congress is able to
pass immigration legislation of some sort, it may fail to bring changes that
substantially soften the indiscriminate harshness of the current deportation
laws, instead continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion to address
proportionality concerns. The following section discusses steps that the
executive branch might take to further improve the removal system in the
absence of legislative action.
B. Improving Executive Discretion
As I have argued, the primary deficiencies in the Obama
Administration’s implementation of fairness through enforcement
discretion are (1) inconsistency in evaluating the normative merits of
individual removal cases across and within jurisdictions and (2) failure to
balance equities in cases involving noncitizens with almost any kind of
criminal history.355
With respect to lack of consistency, DHS must do more than issue
guidelines on the importance of prosecutorial discretion in the removal
system. Guidelines and trainings are important, but ground-level ICE
operatives also need real incentives to exercise equitable discretion in
while the other focused on certain agricultural workers. See Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); INA §§ 210(a)(2)(A),
245A(a)–(b) (2002). See generally RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22111,
ALIEN LEGALIZATION AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS: A PRIMER 5 (2010).
353. See generally MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY SINCE 9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION
REFORM (2011); Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration
Deal, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/06/24/
getting-to-maybe [http://perma.cc/Y78B-2LPT].
354. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 172–207. A political skirmish early in
2015 nearly resulted in the failure to fund DHS at all. See Everett & Kim, supra note 48.
355. See supra Part III.A.
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consistent and effective ways. I have suggested how the immigration
agencies might create such incentives in more detail elsewhere and briefly
reiterate some of those points here.356 First, each individual noncitizen
facing removal should have his or her case assigned to an individual ICE
attorney prosecutor—or, as a second best option in the initial stages of
proceedings, a small unit—who ultimately will be responsible for litigating
the hearing. Ideally this assignment should be made before charges are
filed with the immigration court, and, at the least, case-handling
responsibility should be designated before the first calendar hearing in
proceedings. This vertical prosecution design would elevate ICE attorneys’
incentive to scrutinize individual cases for both merit and possible
favorable discretion because they would know from the outset that they
would bear ultimate responsibility for litigating the matter.357 It would also
provide a clear channel of communication for a noncitizen facing removal
who wants to make a case that he or she warrants favorable discretion.358
Relatedly, ICE officials’ appropriate exercise of discretion should become
part of their regular performance evaluations, for which it apparently plays
no role at present.359 This change would similarly increase the incentives
for early, individualized examination of the merits and equities of
noncitizens’ deportation cases.
Another important procedural reform would require ICE attorneys to turn
over the noncitizen’s “A-file” (excepting confidential information) in any
case in which the individual intends to contest removability, seek relief, or
obtain the assistance of counsel.360 I suggested above that Congress
mandate this responsibility through statute, but in the absence of legislation,
the Executive could implement the reform through rulemaking or
administrative policy. This obligation would give noncitizens access to
documents that might bear on their ability to rebut the government’s
charges of deportability or to establish eligibility for discretionary relief
from the immigration judge. It would also lead trial attorneys to scrutinize
cases earlier in the process than they currently do, making it more likely
that low-priority cases would be screened out.361
The government might take a number of steps to address its failure to
adequately engage in normative balancing before the deportation of
noncitizens with criminal history. First, an enforcement policy that aims to
356. See generally Cade, supra note 11.
357. Id. Even if vertical prosecution assignments are not made before removal
proceedings are begun, an attorney should review every charging document before it is filed
in immigration court, as others and I have suggested. See CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS,
supra note 348; Cade, supra note 11.
358. Under current agency guidance, noncitizens in detention or facing removal
proceedings who believe they merit favorable discretion are instructed to submit their
request to a general mailbox or telephone number for the relevant agency subdivision. See
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC.: U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
immigrationAction/faqs (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/T2CP-6GCZ].
359. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
360. See Cade, supra note 11, at 62.
361. Id. at 70–74.
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ensure that removals are not unjustified would prioritize among offenders,
focusing on those whose convictions suggest a threat to public safety.
Recent policy revisions under DHS Secretary Johnson take a small step in
this direction, but do not go far enough.362 Barring other negative factors,
the government generally should not seek to deport noncitizens whose only
criminal history consists of low-level offenses (let alone mere arrests). This
approach would recognize that the gravity of minor convictions is generally
not proportional to the severity of deportation. Misdemeanor convictions, it
is increasingly recognized, are particularly unreliable indicators of
culpability or wrongdoing.363 At a minimum, federal enforcers should stop
filing and zealously litigating removal cases that seek the most egregious
immigration outcomes possible for nonserious offenders.364
Second, ICE could implement a general policy of declining to seek the
removal of noncitizens on the basis of criminal history that is not
considered a continuing conviction under the applicable penal law.
Noncitizens whose convictions have been deferred, expunged, pardoned, or
set aside cannot easily be considered out of step with the social norms of
the communities in which they live. To the contrary, in such cases the
criminal justice system has formally recognized that the noncitizen’s
rehabilitation, remorse, reintegration, or other mitigating factors warrant
removing (or avoiding altogether) the specter of continuing direct or
collateral consequences. Seen in this light, these ameliorating criminal
justice processes can serve as a valuable surrogate for the equitable
balancing that should take place in removal proceedings.365 Pardons,
expungements, and similar events signify to enforcement officials that
banishing the noncitizen on the basis of the underlying criminal history
would not be proportional, absent other indicia of undesirability or threat to
public safety. Thus, these actions could function as “disproportionality
rules of thumb,” counseling against deportation in the usual case but not
binding the agency when a case presents factors that warrant overcoming
the presumption. To be sure, pardons and judicial expungements may be
easier to obtain in some jurisdictions than others, resulting in

362. See Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4 (noncitizens with one or more
felonies are a top priority for enforcement, while noncitizens convicted of one “significant
misdemeanor” or any three misdemeanors (other than traffic violations) remain the agency’s
second-highest priority).
363. See Cade, supra note 58, at 1808–11; supra text accompanying note 283. The
government should also exercise discretion not to pursue removal in situations where the
noncitizen was brought to immigration proceedings through racial profiling or other
constitutional violations. While such situations may not raise proportionality concerns, they
do implicate another aspect of the removal system’s normative justifiability. See Cade, supra
note 52, at 198–203.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 249–68 (discussing the government’s losses
before the Supreme Court in cases such as Mellouli, Carachuri, Moncrieffe, and Lopez).
365. I develop this potential administrative reform further in a forthcoming essay that
takes as its launching point an August 2015 sentencing order by Federal District Court Judge
Jack B. Weinstein, in which Judge Weinstein made a judicial recommendation against
deportation despite the absence of statutory authority to do so. See Jason A. Cade, Return of
the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2015).
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inconsistencies.366 That fact does not present a persuasive reason not to
adopt this proposal, however, because inconsistencies are already endemic
in the criminal deportation system. Not all prosecutors have the same
priorities or resources. Similar offenses can result in disparate immigration
consequences, depending on how the state defines the crime.367 Indeed, a
deportation system that deferred to these disproportionality rules of thumb
might actually promote consistency by reducing the impact of disparate
outcomes for noncitizens caught up in the criminal justice systems of
different jurisdictions.
Finally, the Executive should generally not seek to remove lawfully
present noncitizens on the basis of criminal history from the distant past. A
noncitizen whose conviction was obtained long ago is unlikely to pose a
continuing threat to public safety or social mores.368 To this end, the
government should direct immigration prosecutors to exercise (or at least
seriously consider) favorable discretion where the conviction is sufficiently
attenuated by time and no other negative factors are present.369 This
“administrative laches” policy would help compensate for the absence of
limitations periods in the deportation statutory scheme.370 Undoubtedly,
DHS would instruct ICE attorneys to continue to prosecute cases that raise
366. See Barkow, supra note 123, at 1349; MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, NAT’L ASSOC. OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT, CHART #
4—JUDICIAL EXPUNGEMENT, SEALING, AND SET-ASIDE (2015), http://www.nacdl.org/
uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Judicial_Expungement_Sealin
g_and_Set-Aside.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3MN-BY96]; MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, NAT’L
ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT,
CHART # 3—CHARACTERISTICS OF PARDON AUTHORITIES (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/
uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Characteristics_of_Pardon_Au
thorities.pdf [http://perma.cc/MB2U-N85P].
367. See, e.g., Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1735
(2011) (“Under a categorical analysis, two people who commit the same offense but are able
to secure different plea deals or are prosecuted in jurisdictions that define the offense
differently will face different immigration consequences.”).
368. See Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S.
Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1627–28 (2012) (discussing sociological research indicating
that the risk of recidivism decreases over time and age, including recent studies suggesting
that individuals who stay arrest-free for seven years following prior contact with the criminal
justice system “pose very little risk of future crime”).
369. DHS’s November 2014 memo on the agency’s enforcement priorities hints at the
possibility of discretion for persons with criminal history, but requires supervisory approval
and lacks the sharpness necessary to ensure that agents engage in balancing to ensure
proportionality in every individual case. See Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 159, at 5–
6 (indicating that noncitizens falling within the agency’s top priority should be removed
unless, “in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief, or CBP Director
of Field Operations, there are compelling and exceptional factors that clearly indicate the
alien is not a threat to national security, border security, or public safety and should not
therefore be an enforcement priority”); id. at 5 (“Likewise, aliens in Priority 2 should be
removed . . . unless, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief,
CBP Director of Field Operations, USCIS District Director, or USCIS Service Center
Director, there are factors indicating the alien is not a threat to national security, border
security, or public safety and should not therefore be an enforcement priority.”).
370. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress should adopt
statutes of limitations or probationary periods for the criminal removal grounds).
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other indicia of danger or undesirability, regardless of the passage of time
since a conviction. Likely, too, egregious offenses (e.g., rape and murder)
would be exempted from this policy, and reasonably so.
Executive reforms such as these would help further justice in removal
proceedings. If ICE attorneys and agents are not up to the job of exercising
discretion in these ways or for these groups of noncitizens, the Executive
should expand upon the insights gleaned from DACA by outsourcing
discretionary consideration in a wider swath of cases to specialized units
within USCIS.371 For example, as Margaret Taylor has suggested, the
Executive might implement a policy allowing noncitizens to proactively file
affirmative non-LPR cancellation of removal applications with USCIS.372
Additionally, as Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has argued, DHS could use the
APA to issue administrative rules governing prosecutorial discretion and
deferred action.373 This approach would open up the possibility of judicial
review, provide greater clarity and uniformity, and possibly avoid some of
the controversy that attends to executive-based equity. The general lack of
finality, institutional discomfort, and other endemic drawbacks will remain,
however, relegating such administrative approaches to a second-best
solution to a deeply systemic problem.374
CONCLUSION
Congressional amendments to the immigration code in the 1980s and
1990s set in motion a radical transformation of immigration law, the full
implications of which are still being realized. The decline of formal
channels for ensuring that individual deportations are proportional and
equitable has shifted responsibility to the Executive to implement rigid
immigration rules in a normatively defensible way. In recent years, the
Obama Administration has endeavored to promote fairness through targeted
use of resources and prosecutorial discretion, and by and large these efforts
have been laudable. Nevertheless, relying solely on law enforcement actors
to keep the system equitable has thus far come up short. In particular, the
administration of the current removal system inadequately addresses the
need to assess individualized equities in deportation cases, especially in
cases that concern noncitizens who have criminal history.
If Congress or the Executive do not take further steps to make the
deportation system proportional, the responsibility to promote the value of
individualized equity-based decision making in regard to life-defining legal
choices about deportation will fall to federal courts. Indeed, this is the
371. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the benefits of DACA’s institutional design).
372. Taylor, supra note 113, at 549–50.
373. See Wadhia, supra note 193, at 282–86, 294–95.
374. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
463, 526 (2012) (“No matter how much discretion becomes inculcated into the immigration
enforcement mechanisms, it will always appear to be too much and too generous for
restrictionists, especially those in Congress, and those same policies will appear to be too
little for accommodationists and immigrant advocates.”).
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theme of a number of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this field. As
I have suggested elsewhere, a majority of justices appear uncomfortable
with—and motivated to regulate—the modern immigration regime’s lack of
adjudicative equity.375 Underlying this emerging jurisprudence is the
principle that severe penalties imposed on the basis of criminal convictions
must be predicated on considerations of individualized justice, a topic I take
up more fully in another project.376

375. See Cade, supra note 51.
376. See Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity (work in progress on file with
author).

